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I. INTRODUCTION
Everyone talks about bank failure, but, like complaints about the weather, very
little seems to be done about it. Although bank failures receive extensive press
coverage, 1 the task of dealing with the consequences of failure has traditionally been
left largely to the bank regulators. 2 Recently, these regulatory efforts have come
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1. Especially recently, bank failure and problems in the banking industry attract front page attention. See, e.g.,
Nash, Large Texas Bank to Get $1 Billion in Federal Rescue, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1988, at Al, col. 6; Rehm, FDIC
Believes Tide Has Turned After Record Number of Failures, Am. Banker, Jan. 5, 1989, at 1, col. 2 (200 banks failed in
1988). The ongoing crisis in the thrift industry also has focused attention on the solvency, or insolvency, of many
commercial banks. For discussion of the impact of thrift problems on bank failure resolution techniques, see infra text
accompanying notes 12-14 and 90-100.
2. Bank insolvency procedures differ from corporate bankruptcy and reorganization in a number of respects.
when a bank becomes insolvent, it may be closed by its principal regulator, either the Comptroller of the Currency in the
case of national banks or the relevant state chartering authority in the case of state-chartered banks. If the bank is federally
insured, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is appointed receiver and takes charge of paying insured
depositors out of the deposit insurance fund and liquidating the bank's assets. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1982). The FDIC
also has the authority to arrange alternative dispositions of a failing insured bank either before or after it is formally closed.
An example of the FDIC's flexibility to arrange solutions for problem banks was provided by the disposition of First
RepublicBank Corporation of Dallas, Texas, a bank holding company with 41 subsidiary banks. Initially, the FDIC
provided 51 million in emergency assistance directly to the subsidiary banks in order to reassure depositors and halt
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under increased scrutiny and attack. In some cases, criticism has been directed at
regulatory actions that prevent a bank from failing, for example, by providing direct
financial assistance to keep a bank open3 or by arranging its merger with a healthy
institution.4 These solutions are thought to dull the incentives created by the threat of
failure for managers, shareholders, and creditors to operate banks responsibly. 5 Even
when the regulators allow banks to fail, criticism has focused on deposit insurance 6
for removing incentives for insured depositors to monitor their banks. 7
If these criticisms are valid, how should the regulatory system respond to bank
failure? The obvious alternative to current bank failure policy is simply to treat bank
failure like the failure of any other business firn. Such an approach would save the
regulatory system the considerable administrative and capital costs currently incurred
in arranging special dispositions of failing and failed banks. 8 In addition, it might
even have a salutary effect on healthy banks and their investors. If bank investors
faced the threat of loss as a result of bank failure, they might have an incentive to
engage in better monitoring of bank risk.9 Ideally, such improved monitoring would
discipline opportunistic or high risk behavior by bank management, thereby prevent-
ing bank failure. '0
Some aspects of the case for market discipline, such as the feasibility of en-
deposit runs. The FDIC then began negotiations with potential purchasers of First RepublicBank's banking business.
When the FDIC found an acceptable purchaser, the subsidiary banks were closed and their assets and liabilities transferred
to a specially created bridge bank that initially was capitalized by the FDIC but that would be managed and eventually
purchased by the acquiring bank. This disposition, which took approximately four months to arrange, ensured that neither
creditors nor customers of the banks suffered any losses or interruptions in service. See BHC Allowed to Acquire Bridge
Bank, [ 1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 87,416 (July 29, 1988). For a description of these and
other methods of disposing of failed banks, see Bovenzi & Murton, Resolution Costs of Bank Failures, 1 FDIC BANrING
REv. 1 (1988).
3. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (Supp. V 1987); see also supra note 2 for an example of open-bank assistance. In order
to provide open-bank assistance, the FDIC must determine that such assistance is less costly than liquidating the bank and
paying off insured depositors out of the insurance fund or that the bank's continued operation is essential to provide
adequate banking services in its community. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A).
4. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(2) (Supp. V 1987). Again, any financial assistance provided to arrange a merger must be
less than the cost of liquidating the bank and paying off insured depositors, unless the bank's continued operation is
essential to its community. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A).
5. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 1153, 1184 (1988).
6. The bank insurance fund protects all deposits in insured banks up to S100,000 per depositor. 12 U.S.C. §
1813(m)(1) (1982).
7. Protection of these bank stakeholders from the consequences of their own excessive risk-taking is said to create
a moral hazard problem. See E. KANE, THE GATHERING CRIusIs IN FEDERAL DErosrr INsuRANcE 14 (1985).
8. These costs include expenses of examining and appraising failed bank assets, financial assistance provided
directly to a failing bank to keep it open or to an acquiring bank to permit it to assume a failed bank's liabilities, payments
to insured depositors out of the insurance fund, administrative and legal costs associated with the liquidation of assets and
collection of claims, and losses on assets or equity acquired by the FDIC from a failed bank. In recent years, these costs
have grown. In 1988, for the first time in the FDIC's history, expenses exceeded both premiums paid by insured banks
and investment income. Rehm, FDIC's ShortfallHit $10Billion in '88, Am. Banker, Apr. 26, 1989, at 1, col. 1. In 1989,
the deficit in the sister thrift insurance fund required a major recapitalization. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) [hereinafter FIRREA].
9. See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1193-1225. This assumes that current bank failure policy prevents
investor losses that would be suffered in corporate bankruptcy. In fact, this assumption is not completely accurate. See
infra text accompanying notes 41-45.
10. Id. at 1226 (better monitoring would "not only reduce the high incidence of bank failures due to fraud and
mismanagement, but would also reduce the incidence of failures due to insufficient asset diversification and fluctuations
in the business cycle").
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couraging more effective depositor discipline of bank risk-taking, have already been
subject to extensive debate by this author and others." This debate, and discussion
of bank failure policy generally, have been given new urgency by recent events. The
thrift industry crisis, which necessitated a costly recapitalization of the thrift insur-
ance fund in 1989,12 has demonstrated that deposit insurance funds are not invulner-
able. This in turn has focused attention on the cost of bank failure to the bank
insurance fund and to the government. Less costly alternatives to present failure
resolution techniques are actively being sought.' 3 At the same time, the problems
experienced by the thrift industry have increased the responsibility and visibility of
the bank regulators in handling failed depository institutions. As a result of the thrift
restructuring legislation, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has be-
come responsible for administering both the bank insurance fund and the newly
recapitalized savings association insurance fund, and for overseeing the disposition of
distressed banks and thrifts. '4 The viability of the deposit insurance system thus
depends on the success or failure of the FDIC's failed bank policy.
In this time of restructuring of the deposit insurance system, there is a real need
to consider the interrelated problems of bank failure, regulatory disposition of failed
banks, and the impact of that disposition on healthy banks and their investors. In this
Article, I address several general concerns that are raised by the current debate over
bank failure policy. First, any bank failure policy must address two separate prob-
lems: how to prevent banks from engaging in excessive risk-taking that is likely to
result in failure, and how to deal with failure when it occurs. Many critics of current
bank failure policy see a tradeoff between regulatory initiatives that seek to produce
better managed banks, which can be described as "healthy bank policy," and those
that seek to manage the consequences of failure, which can be described as "un-
healthy bank policy." For example, it is assumed that if the quality of bank man-
agement could be improved, ideally through better market discipline, then bank
failures could be avoided, removing the necessity for costly and undesirable regula-
tory intervention to prevent or minimize the adverse effects of a bank closing. '
11. See Macey & Garrett, Market Discipline By Depositors: A Summary of Theoretical and Empirical Arguments,
5 YALE J. ON REG. 215 (1988); Garten, Banking On the Market: Relying On Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE
J. ON REG. 129 (1986) [hereinafter Banking]; Garten, Still Banking on the Market: A Comment on the Failure of Market
Discipline, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 241 (1988) [hereinafter Still Banking]. I have argued that depositor discipline is unrealistic
because many depositors have no incentive to monitor bank risk and that those who do judge bank safety on the basis of
such factors as the likely regulatory disposition of the bank in the event of failure. Some readers may conclude from this
that the failure of market discipline is the fault of regulation such as deposit insurance and special regulatory dispositions
of failing banks. As this Article shows, this is not the case. Market discipline, by either depositors or shareholders, is an
inefficient substitute for current bank failure policy.
12. See supra note 8.
13. Recently, there have been renewed calls for radical changes to the deposit insurance system, including
limitations on insurance coverage. See FIRREA, supra note 8, § 1001 (commissioning new study of deposit insurance,
including feasibility of reducing insurance coverage). Similar proposals have been considered-and rejected-in the past.
See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Deposit Insurance in a Changing Environment 111-11 (1983) (earlier
study of deposit insurance recommends changes in insurance coverage). It is noteworthy that the recent thrift reform
legislation, although restructuring the thrift insurance fund, did not make significant changes in either basic insurance
coverage or the regulators' choice of failure resolution techniques. See FIRREA, supra note 8.
14. See FIRREA, supra note 8, § 212 (giving FDIC authority to dispose of troubled thrifts as well as banks).
15. See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1226.
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This approach to bank failure policy is flawed in several respects. Initially, it
assumes that only "bad" banks-those that are mismanaged or otherwise ineffi-
cient-fail. Further, it assumes that there is never any justification for regulatory
intervention to prevent the failure of a bad bank. Yet not all bank failures represent
either the weeding out of badly managed institutions or the transfer of resources to
more efficient uses. Moreover, bank failure policy cannot be wholly, or even pri-
marily, concerned with creating incentives for healthy banks to avoid failure.
Second, critics of current bank failure policy assume that the major stakeholders
in a bank-managers, shareholders, depositors, and regulators' 6-share the same
goals with respect to bank failure. For example, it is often assumed that encouraging
a more active bank takeover market would create incentives for corporate raiders to
identify and acquire those banks that are on the road to failure, thereby imposing
market discipline on incumbent management.17 But market discipline may mean
different things to different people. This is particularly true in the market for corpo-
rate control. Shareholders shun companies with poor earnings, leading to depressed
share prices. Companies with depressed share prices tend to be targets of acquisi-
tions. Incumbent managers who fear takeovers therefore will feel pressure to improve
earnings in order to raise share prices. But this may require management to take more
risks, not fewer. The result may be market discipline, but it will not lead to fewer
bank failures. Thus, the regulatory system cannot afford to rely too extensively on
market forces to set a bank failure policy.
This Article explores these problems inherent in fashioning an effective bank
failure policy. Part II considers the causes and effects of bank failure and refutes the
notion that bank failure is a threat only to badly managed banks. It then describes the
complex goals that must be served by a bank failure policy. Part III explains why
bank failure policy cannot count on shareholders, depositors, or other creditors to
exert market discipline that reduces either the frequency or the cost of bank failure.
Part IV considers possible alternatives to current bank failure policy, such as facil-
itating a more active bank takeover market. It concludes that such an alternative at
best will be ineffective and at worst will lead to even more frequent bank failure.
Finally, Part V offers some suggestions for reconciling the goal of unhealthy bank
policy-minimizing the cost of bank failure-with the goal of healthy bank policy-
encouraging better managed and safer banks.
II. THE PROBLEM OF BANK FAILURE
One's opinion of current bank failure policy generally reflects one's view of
bank failure itself. If bank failure poses a threat to other healthy banks or the banking
system, that threat may justify a regulatory policy designed to minimize these ex-
16. Other bank constituencies, such as customers and employees, are also concerned about bank failure. Yet the
four stakeholders mentioned here are most directly implicated in bringing about the bank's failure as well as determining
its ultimate disposition. See infra text accompanying notes 22-50.
17. See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1203-12; see generally Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control, 73 J. POL. Ecot. 110, 112 (1965) (suggesting market for corporate control can function as a substitute for
bankruptcy).
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ternal or spillover effects of bank failure.' 8 If, on balance, bank failure has a salutary
effect, such as weeding out weak or inefficient institutions, then regulatory concern
over the growing rate of bank failure may be misplaced.
Critics of current bank failure policy argue that the present fear of bank failure
may be exaggerated. Since failure serves the beneficial function of eliminating mis-
managed or uncompetitive banks, there is no reason for regulation to prevent bank
failure.19 Moreover, to the extent that regulatory policies do prevent failure, they
discourage discipline by shareholders and depositors that would serve as a check on
bank risk-taking. 20 Thus, bank failure policy should focus on encouraging better
market discipline of healthy banks rather than preventing the failure of unhealthy
banks. 21
Initially, it is important to clarify what "failure" means in the context of
regulated banks. Current bank failure policy does not prevent failure in the sense that
all bank stakeholders-managers, 22 shareholders, depositors, and other cred-
itors23-emerge with their interests in the bank intact. Rather, bank failure policy,
like any bankruptcy policy, affects which stakeholders lose their investments and
which are protected as a result of business failure. Bank failure differs from other
business failure because of the FDIC's discretion to adopt alternative responses to
bank failure that vary these gains and losses.
Recently, the FDIC has used five alternative methods of handling failing
banks. 24 First, the FDIC may simply liquidate the bank, reimbursing the bank's
insured deposits up to 100,000 dollars out of the insurance fund25 and disposing of the
bank's assets for the benefit of creditors, 26 including uninsured depositors (those with
deposits in amounts over 100,000 dollars)2 7 and the insurance fund itself, which is
18. These externalities arise because of the inability of affected parties, such as investors in other banks injured by
the failure, to allocate the cost of bank failure efficiently by private contract. For a discussion of the reasons for
externalities in the marketplace, see generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
19. See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1155.
20. See id. at 1172-93.
21. See id. at 1225 ("The goal of the regulatory system should be to provide private parties with incentives to
monitor bank management and control excessive risk taking by banks").
22. Managers' stake in the continued viability of their banks results from their employment relationship, which is
terminated if the bank fails, and the effect of failure on their professional reputations. In addition, many bank managers
are also shareholders and depositors.
23. Another important stakeholder is the bank regulatory system itself. Under the deposit insurance scheme, the
FDIC is responsible for administering the liquidation or reorganization of failed banks. Moreover, the insurance fund has
a direct financial stake in bank failure, since the fund will bear the cost of paying off insured depositors or providing other
assistance to facilitate the transfer of insured deposits to another bank. See infra text accompanying notes 24-40. More
generally, if one bank failure has spillover effects on the operations of healthy banks, the banking system itself may be
impaired. See supra text accompanying note 18.
24. This discussion of current alternatives relies heavily on Bovenzi & Murton, supra note 2, at 2-4. Since the
FDIC is constantly experimenting with new, less costly approaches to handling failed banks, any description of current
practices risks becoming rapidly out of date. The recently adopted thrift restructuring legislation made some changes in
the FDIC's statutory authority to adopt alternative resolution techniques. See FIRREA, supra note 8, §§ 211-217
(amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821-23). Iese changes were largely technical and did not affect the FDIC's choice of
alternative dispositions or discretion to adopt new approaches.
25. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f) (1982), amended by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 212.
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c),(d),(e) (1982), amended by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 212.
27. Such depositors will receive the first $100,000 of their investment from the insurance fund. For the rest, they
generally are relegated to the bank's assets along with all other unsecured creditors. Some states may have depositor
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subrogated to the claims of the insured depositors. 28 As a result, insured depositors
are repaid in full, but uninsured depositors and other unsecured creditors receive only
their proportionate share of collections on the failed bank's assets.2 9 Bank sharehold-
ers, as well as shareholders and creditors of the failed bank's holding company,
typically receive no special treatment. 30
Second, the FDIC may arrange for a healthy bank to assume the failing bank's
liabilities and some or all of its assets. 31 As a result, both insured and uninsured
depositors and other creditors are generally protected, becoming creditors of the
assuming bank. As the transfer usually takes place after the bank is declared insolvent
and closed, 32 shareholders do not have to consent to the sale of assets. As in a deposit
payoff, they are entitled only to their share of the proceeds of liquidation of any assets
that are not transferred to the acquiring bank. 33 Since the acquiring bank is likely to
purchase the best assets, very little will be left for shareholders in the ensuing
liquidation. 34
Third, the FDIC may arrange a purchase and assumption in which only insured
deposits and secured liabilities are transferred to the acquiring bank. 35 In this case,
uninsured depositors and creditors also must look to the proceeds of liquidation of any
unpurchased assets for repayment of their claims.
Fourth, the FDIC may arrange some form of open-bank assistance. 36 Although
technically such assistance prevents a failing bank from closing its doors, it is not
preference statutes that give uninsured depositors in state-chartered banks priority over other general creditors in a
liquidation.
28. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(g) (1982), amended by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 212.
29. In the past, these creditors ultimately have recovered a large proportion of their total investments. See FDIC
ANN. REP. 1983 at 14 (as of end of 1983, 99.1 % of all depositors in bank liquidations were repaid in full). Nevertheless,
such creditors are subject both to substantial delays before they receive any payment and to the risk that the bank's assets
will turn out to be insufficient to satisfy all creditors in full. Since failed banks with valuable assets tend to be merged
with healthy institutions rather than liquidated, this latter risk is very real. Occasionally, the FDIC has been willing to
advance uninsured creditors a portion of their claims based on conservative estimates of the liquidation value of the bank's
assets. See Bovenzi & Murton, supra note 2, at 2 n.2 (describing this "modified payoff").
30. As in any liquidation, bank shareholders (whether unaffiliated investors or a bank holding company) receive
their proportionate share of any assets remaining after repayment of creditors. Since the claims of creditors (including
uninsured depositors and the deposit insurance fund) in an institution as highly leveraged as a bank are likely to be
substantial, few if any assets tend to be left over for shareholders to divide.
31. This transaction is called a "purchase and assumption." See Bovenzi & Murton, supra note 2, at 2. The FDIC
generally must provide financial assistance to the purchaser to cover the difference between the value of the assumed
liabilities and the acquired assets. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(2) (Supp. V 1987), amended by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 217
(permitting FDIC to advance funds to facilitate mergers of failed banks).
32. The bank's primary regulator has the discretion to make a determination of insolvency and close the bank. See
supra note 2; see also Golden Pac. Bancorp v. Clarke, 837 F.2d 509, 512 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 223 (1988)
(agency discretion to close insolvent bank not subject to judicial review absent arbitrariness or bad faith).
33. Shareholders still rank behind any remaining creditors of the failed bank, such as subordinated debtholders and
the deposit insurance fund to the extent that the FDIC has advanced funds to arrange the purchase and assumption.
34. The FDIC tries to sell as many of the failed bank's assets as possible to the acquiring bank in order to minimize
liquidation costs. See Bovenzi & Murton, supra note 2, at 3.
35. See id. at 3 (describing this "insured-deposit transfer"). The FDIC must advance sufficient cash to the
acquiring bank to cover these liabilities. The acquiring bank will often use this cash to buy some of the failed bank's
assets.
36. Such assistance may be provided to prevent a bank from closing, to restore a closed bank to normal operations,
or when severe financial conditions exist that threaten the stability of a significant number of insured banks or the stability
of insured banks possessing significant financial resources. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1) (Supp. V 1987), amended by
FIRREA, supra note 8, § 217. For an example of the use of open-bank assistance, see supra note 2.
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intended as a subsidy to shareholders or management. As a condition to granting
assistance, the FDIC requires the infusion of substantial new private capital, which
reduces existing shareholders' interests in the bank.37 In addition, the FDIC generally
insists on the replacement of incumbent management. 38 The claims of depositors and
other bank creditors are preserved intact. Occasionally, open-bank assistance is de-
signed to keep the bank open until a permanent solution, such as a purchase and
assumption, can be arranged. 39
Finally, the FDIC may create a new "bridge" bank to assume the assets and
liabilities of the failing bank until a permanent solution can be arranged. 4° As in a
purchase and assumption, depositors and other bank creditors become creditors of the
assuming bank. Shareholders must satisfy their claims out of whatever assets remain
in the failed bank.
Thus, whatever the disposition, a failed bank's managers and shareholders suffer
losses similar to those experienced by managers and shareholders in nonbank busi-
ness failure. 4' If the failed bank is owned by a bank holding company, the holding
company's shareholders and debtholders generally receive no special protection re-
gardless of whether the bank is liquidated, merged with a healthy bank, or receives
open-bank assistance. 42 In fact, bank holding company investors may be in a worse
position than investors in a nonbank conglomerate with a bankrupt subsidiary. Since
the bank is the most important asset of most bank holding companies, its liquidation
or transfer may leave the bank holding company without adequate sources of funds
to pay its own debt, resulting in its bankruptcy. 43 Further, whenever possible, the
bank regulators have an interest in forcing the bank holding company to use the
resources of its healthy banking and nonbanking operations to bail out a failing bank
37. See FDIC, Statement of Policy and Criteria on Assistance to Operating Insured Banks, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,122
(Dec. 8, 1986) [hereinafter FDIC Statement].
38. See id. For example, in providing open-bank assistance to First City Bancorporation of Texas, the FDIC
required the bank holding company to raise S500 million in new equity capital, reducing the interest of existing
shareholders to less than three percent of total equity. The FDIC also insisted on new management. See FDIC Agrees to
Assistance Plan for Texas BHC Subsidiary Banks, 11987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 87,067
(Sept. 9, 1987). Existing shareholders may prefer to keep a three percent interest in an ongoing institution rather than to
incur the uncertainty and delays of a liquidation. In this sense, they are "better off" with open-bank assistance than with
other regulatory dispositions of failed banks. See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1176. Nevertheless, in either case,
the potential losses are substantial enough that shareholders should prefer to avoid bank failure entirely.
39. See supra note 2 (describing disposition of First Republic). Generally, the terms of assistance provide for
eventual repayment with interest by the bank or any successor. See FDIC Statement, supra note 37, at 44,122. For an
example of one such arrangement, see infra note 44 (First Republic).
40. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(i) (Supp. V 1987), amended by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 214; see also supra note 2.
41. In fact, the cost of failure may be greater for bank managers and shareholders than for nonbank managers and
shareholders. See infra text accompanying notes 43-45.
42. The regulatory disposition of Continental Illinois in 1984 was an exception to this practice. The FDIC's
financial assistance plan guaranteed protection to bank holding company creditors as well as bank creditors. See Com-
prehensive Financial Assistance Plan Set for Continental Illinois National Bank, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) T 99,972 (May 17, 1984). Since then, the FDIC has indicated that it will not protect shareholders
or creditors of a failed bank's holding company. See FDIC Statement, supra note 37, at 44,123 (impact of open-bank
assistance on holding company directors, management, shareholders, and creditors should approximate what would be
expected had the subsidiary bank failed).
43. This happened in the case of First RepublicBank Corporation, which was forced to declare bankruptcy after its
banking assets were transferred to a bridge bank. See supra note 2; see also Klinkerman, Texas Bank Rescues Pit Wall
Street Investors Against Regulators, Am. Banker, Nov. 29, 1988, at 12, col. 4 [hereinafter Texas Bank].
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subsidiary. 44 For example, the FDIC has required healthy bank subsidiaries to guar-
antee federal financial assistance provided to their failing bank subsidiary and has
demanded that a bank holding company contribute nonbanking resources to its failing
subsidiary banks as a condition to receiving FDIC assistance. 45
Therefore, the principal difference among the alternative regulatory responses to
bank failure is whether or not they result in protection of uninsured depositors and
other creditors of the failed bank. 46 Debate over current bank failure policy ultimately
can be reduced to the question of whether these particular creditors should be winners
or losers in bank failure. Critics of bank failure policy argue that special protection
of uninsured creditors is not justified, and may interfere with the market discipline
created by the threat of failure. 47
This argument ignores the reasons why, in some bank failures, regulatory dis-
position has had the effect of protecting uninsured as well as insured depositors. First,
not all bad banks fail, nor are all banks that fail necessarily bad banks. Thus, using
bank failure policy to penalize depositors who have invested in a failed bank will not
necessarily encourage depositors to avoid badly managed banks.
Second, the process of business failure and reorganization is itself costly. Failure
rarely means the welcome demise of an inefficient business. Instead, it signals the
beginning of a lengthy bargaining process among stakeholders. During this bargain-
ing, assets are tied up. Creditors' funds are frozen. Managers and employees are
demoralized. Customers are in limbo. Ironically, the methods of failure resolution
about which critics of bank failure policy complain the most, such as federally
assisted mergers48 and open-bank assistance, 49 actually minimize these costs of fail-
ure by facilitating the rapid transfer of an intact banking business to new owners or
managers.
Finally, there are important reasons to be concerned about bank failure apart
from its effect on uninsured depositors. Deposit insurance gives certain innocent
bystanders-healthy banks and their depositors, the bank regulatory system, and the
public-a stake in bank failure that is more direct than the stake of competitors,
government, or the public in other business failure. Any bank failure imposes costs on
44. In 1988, the FDIC required that its $1 billion loan to First Republic's lead bank be guaranteed by each of First
Republic's bank subsidiaries. When the FDIC called the loan following the insolvency of First Republic's lead bank, the
remaining banks were unable to meet their obligations under the guarantees and were declared insolvent and closed. The
FDIC then arranged the sale of all the banks to a new owner, leaving the holding company's shareholders and creditors
with no healthy bank assets. See BHC Allowed to Acquire Bridge Bank, supra note 2, at V 94,056. Recently enacted thrift
restructuring legislation explicitly authorizes the FDIC to seek reimbursement of losses incurred in disposing of a failed
bank from its affiliated banks or thrifts. See FIRREA, supra note 8, § 206.
45. For example, the FDIC insisted that MCorp, a Texas bank holding company, contribute S400 million of
nonbank assets to bail out its failing subsidiary banks. See Texas Bank, supra note 43, at 3, col. I. Although the FDIC's
attempt to force such a contribution was unsuccessful, the FDIC subsequently asserted claims against the bankrupt holding
company for costs incurred in arranging the sale of its failed bank subsidiaries. See Klinkerman, FDIC Sees Quick Sale
of Closed MCorp Units, Parent Faces Years of Legal Struggles, Am. Banker, Mar. 30, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
46. There may also be a difference in impact on bank borrowers and other customers. In a liquidation, these
banking relationships may be terminated, while other forms of disposition may result in the transfer of loans and other
business intact to a healthy bank. See infra text accompanying note 82.
47. See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1181.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
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the deposit insurance fund. If these costs are too great, they may result in higher
deposit insurance premiums for healthy banks (and presumably higher charges for
bank customers) 50 and loss of public confidence in the deposit insurance system.
These costs of failure resolution affect how any individual bank failure is handled.
Thus, the regulatory system cannot afford the luxury of a bank failure policy designed
to achieve market discipline.
A. Bank Failure and Bad Banks
Critics of bank failure policy occasionally extol the virtues of bank failure. Bank
failure is a sign that "innovation is driving obsolete firms out of the industry, or that
competition is driving inefficient firms out of the market."- 51 If it is desirable that
inefficient industrial firms fail so that their resources may be transferred to more
productive uses, "it is doubly desirable that an inefficient bank fail."-5 2 These argu-
ments in favor of bank failure assume that banks fail solely because of mismanage-
ment-problems ranging from insider fraud to simply poor managerial decisions such
as inefficient diversification.5 3 If "broad-based fluctuations in the economy are no
longer a significant source of bank failure," 54 then even depositors should not be
concerned that one bank failure will cause deposit runs at other healthy banks. Bad
management, unlike liquidity problems or economic crises, is not contagious.
This view of the causes and effects of bank failure may be reassuring to ob-
servers concerned about the increasing rate of bank failure, but it is also overly
simplistic. Management error, whether actual misconduct or negligence, obviously
contributes to a bank's problems, but less firm-specific factors, such as economic
conditions, government policies, and public confidence in banks, also play a role. In
times of prosperity for the banking industry, many poorly managed banks are able to
survive. This is suggested by the extraordinarily low rate of bank failure from the
1940s through the 1970s. 55 The last generation of bank management may have been
more competent than today's managers. But it is more likely that the profitability of
the banking industry generally allowed many managers to hide their mistakes.
In contrast, declining profitability in traditional banking businesses, intense
competition from nonbank firms and poor economic conditions can make the slightest
of management mistakes fatal for a bank.5 6 This is dramatically illustrated by the
50. Although the competitiveness of the lending market may prevent banks from passing on these costs in the form
of higher interest charges on loans, banks can raise fees for nonlending services and pay below-market rates of interest
on deposits such as transaction accounts that are relatively insensitive to modest changes in interest rates. See Banking,
supra note 11, at 134-37 (arguing that many depositors do not expend resources to shop for marginally better returns on
their deposits).
51. See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1155.
52. See Tussing, The Case For Bank Failure, 10 J.L. & ECON. 129, 146 (1967).
53. Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1169-71.
54. Id. at 1172.
55. From 1934 to 1943, an average of 43 banks failed per year. From 1944 to 1974, fewer than 10 banks failed
per year. See Huber, Mandatory Disclosure of Information About Banks, 6 B.U. Ar. REv. BANKING L. 53, 57-58
(1987). In contrast, in 1988, 200 banks failed. See Rehm, supra note 1, at 1, col. 2.
56. These forces have affected banks during the past two decades. For a description of recent pressure on bank
profitability, and of the reaction of the banking industry, see generally Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective
on Bank Regulation in a Deregulatory Age, 57 FotttAti L. REv. 501 (1989) [hereinafter Growing Pains].
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banking crisis in Texas in the late 1980s.57 Although in many cases mismanagement
was a factor leading to bank failure, the depressed Texas economy also was respon-
sible for banking woes. 58 In any individual case, it is unclear which factor was
primarily to blame.5 9
In hindsight, of course, managers can be faulted for failing to take steps to
protect their banks from general economic threats. For example, Texas banks might
have diversified their assets by making loans to borrowers in New York or Illinois,
or investing in less risky assets, such as government securities. Yet these choices
could have created new and equally serious risks. Asset diversification requires
bankers to make loans to new industries and in regions of the country with which they
have limited experience or expertise. As a result, credit analysis and loan adminis-
tration may suffer.60 Likewise, in today's competitive banking environment, invest-
ing in safe assets, such as government securities, means sacrificing return at a time
when bank liabilities are becoming increasingly costly. 61 Thus, there may be no such
thing as a fail-safe banking policy.62
Finally, the precipitating cause of many bank failures is a liquidity crisis: too
many depositors demand their funds, or the bank cannot obtain sufficient new de-
posits to cover funding needs. Once a large number of depositors start withdrawing
their funds, any bank can experience a funding crisis and fail. Moreover, this crisis
itself will cause any remaining depositors to run to withdraw their funds before the
57. See McTague, Texas Failures Push Midyear Talley to 102 Banks, Am. Banker, July 6, 1989, at 9, col. 2 (68
Texas banks failed in first half of 1989). In a three-year period, nine of the top ten bank holding companies in Texas were
sold in distress sales or needed federal financial assistance. See Klinkerman, FDIC Decides How to Rescue Two Texas
Banks, Am. Banker, July 21, 1989, at 1, col. 1. At least one such bank subsequently required a second rescue. See
Klinkerman, BancTexas Needs Another Rescue, Am. Banker, July 28, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
58. See, e.g., Nash, Large Texas Bank to Get $1 Billion in Federal Rescue, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1988, at Al,
col. 6 (FDIC Chief says economic factors rather than mismanagement were primary cause of First Republic's problems).
59. A study by the Comptroller of the Currency concluded that, although management weakness played a role in
most bank failures, poor economic conditions were a significant cause of problems in more than one-third of the banks
surveyed. See OCC Study Evaluates the Factors Contributing to the Failure of National Banks, [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) T 87,387 (June 1988).
60. For example, Continental Illinois' problems may have been due in part to the Chicago bank's aggressive
diversification into new lending areas, such as energy lending in the Southwest, in which thebank lacked experience.
61. High interest rates on competitive investments, such as money market mutual funds, have forced banks to pay
higher rates on their deposits, increasing their cost of funds. This has greatly complicated management of interest rate risk.
Banks no longer can be sure of a positive spread between the rates they can earn on their assets and the rates they must
pay on their liabilities.
62. Some critics still suggest that today it is easier than ever for a bank to acquire a substantial volume of essentially
riskless assets. Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1172 (paraphrasing Tussing, supra note 52, at 136). Curiously, they rely
for this proposition on an article that was published in 1967, before the revolution in the banking and financial services
industries that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. Since 1970, economic and legal developments such as sustained periods
of high interest rates, deregulation of interest payable on bank deposits, and the growth of the commercial paper market
as an inexpensive alternative to bank loans for many corporate borrowers have fundamentally changed the business of
banking, reducing profitability and increasing risk in traditional banking activities. Thus, the banking business of the late
1980s is very different from the banking business of the late 1960s. Today, a bank that acquires a substantial volume of
riskless (and low yielding) assets may be unable to pay sufficient interest on its deposits to attract investors and fall victim
to a liquidity crisis-or may be taken over by a raider who is less risk averse.
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regulators decide to close the bank.63 Thus, deposit runs take on a life of their own,
creating a special risk for the bank.64
Of course, if a deposit run is occurring because depositors have identified the
bank as badly managed, the run and subsequent bank failure may not be completely
undesirable. 65 But depositors are not always able to identify bad banks. For example,
assume that Bank A fails due to insider fraud. Depositors in neighboring Bank B have
an interest in learning why Bank A failed and whether the same risk exists at Bank
B. So long as these depositors can assure themselves that the misconduct that caused
Bank A's failure does not threaten Bank B, they have no reason to withdraw their
funds from Bank B.
Yet management fraud is very difficult for depositors to detect. 66 Depositors
may be unable to identify exactly what caused Bank A's failure or to evaluate the risk
to Bank B. These depositors may decide simply to remove their funds from Bank B.
Other depositors, seeing this, will follow suit.67
Of course, the failure of any one bank does not necessarily lead to panic and
deposit runs at all other banks, any more than the failure of a nonbanking firm
necessarily leads to panic among securities investors generally. Nevertheless, several
factors make runs more likely in the market for deposits than in the equity market.
First, like any investor facing uncertainty about the solvency of a firm, a depositor
may choose either to liquidate her investment or to verify rumors before making a
decision to hold or sell. This choice depends on the relative costs of exit and mon-
itoring. For a shareholder, neither route is costless. Monitoring requires the share-
holder to incur the expense of acquiring and verifying information. Exit involves
selling the security in the secondary market, requiring the shareholder to pay bro-
kerage fees and to assume the risk of a declining market price. 68
In contrast, the deposit contract allows the holder to redeem her investment
63. This phenomenon has been predicted by economic models of strategic depositor behavior. See, e.g., Chari &
Jagannathan, Banking Panics, Information, and Rational Expectations Equilibrium, 43 J. FiN. 749 (1988); Diamond &
Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983). It has been demonstrated by
experience with real-life deposit runs. See, e.g., Hayes, First RepublicBank in Bailout Talks, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1989,
at D6, col. 2 (deposit run on large Texas bank).
64. Some critics have suggested that banks can avoid liquidity crises by matching the durations of their assets and
liabilities. Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1157. Theoretically, every deposit would be matched with an asset that
matures at exactly the same time that the deposit becomes withdrawable. But this precise matching is impossible. Banks
depend for funding on demand deposits that may be withdrawn at any time without penalty. Unexpectedly heavy
withdrawals of demand deposits may leave a bank with insufficient cash to repay other maturing liabilities. If the bank
then is forced to sell assets quickly to raise cash, it may not be able to realize their full value. The secondary market for
many bank assets, such as commercial loans, does not yet offer the same liquidity as markets for actively traded debt
securities such as treasury bills.
65. Runs even on bad banks can have undesirable distributional consequences. Runs result in unequal treatment of
depositors, favoring those depositors who reach the bank first, and strip the bank of cash and other assets that otherwise
would be available for other creditors in bankruptcy.
66. Even the bank regulators have had difficulty uncovering fraud and insider abuse at banks. See HOUSE COMtM.
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATiONs, FEDE.A RESPONSE TO CRIMINAL MISCONDucT AND INSIDER ABUSE IN THE NATION's FINANCIAL
INsTr=oNs, H.R. REP. No. 1137, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1984) (finding that banking agencies frequently fail to detect
insider criminal misconduct prior to failure). Certainly, depositors cannot be expected to uncover what the regulators so
often miss.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
68. For a discussion of these and other information costs faced by participants in the securities markets, see Gilson
& Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 594-95 (1984).
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without penalty upon demand or at regular short-term intervals. In order to exit, most
depositors do not have to incur the cost of a secondary market transaction or the risk
of a declining market price. 69 Since liquidation is virtually costless, depositors are
likely to react to uncertainty about bank condition by simply refusing to reinvest
maturing deposits rather than by incurring the expense of searching for and verifying
information about their banks.70
Second, unlike a shareholder, a depositor does not have to incur substantial
search costs to find an alternative investment for her funds. The depositor can rein-
vest in any number of alternative short-term debt instruments, such as treasury
securities, commercial paper, money market mutual funds, and deposits in other
banks. These investments offer depositors rates, maturities, and risks that are com-
parable to those of their original deposits and can be acquired and liquidated virtually
without cost. The fungibility of these short-term investments facilitates rapid rein-
vestment of liquidated deposits. 7 1
Third, deposit withdrawals result in an immediate loss of capital for the bank.
Such withdrawals have a more direct impact on a bank's financial position than a
decline in the market price of a firm's shares as a result of panic selling by securities
holders. 72 Deposit runs can be self-fulfilling prophecies: the withdrawals themselves
affect the financial stability of the bank, providing a motive for remaining depositors
to withdraw their funds.
These inherently destabilizing characteristics of the deposit market are suffi-
ciently complex to warrant more detailed consideration later in this Article. 73 The
problem for bank failure policy is not the certainty of the impact of one bank's failure
on other banks, but its very unpredictability. For example, the failure of a small Ohio
thrift institution in 1985, although due to firm-specific mismanagement, led to de-
69. Some deposits are sufficiently long-term that exit may require use of a secondary market. An active secondary
trading market does exist for large wholesale certificates of deposit. In relying on this market for exit, the depositor will
incur trading expenses and the risk of a declining market price, but for many depositors these costs still may be less than
the cost of verifying rumors. See infra note 70. Moreover, other factors, such as the ready availability of substitute
investments, encourage exit rather than monitoring. See infra text accompanying note 71.
70. Recent improvements in bank disclosure and ratings have substantially lowered monitoring costs for some bank
investors. See Banking, supra note 11, at 139-43. Nevertheless, for many depositors, particularly small retail depositors,
obtaining accurate information about banks remains costly. Such depositors do not use brokers or investment advisers in
making their deposits and do not follow private sector or regulatory financial analysis. In any event, when a bank is
experiencing financial distress, its condition may change so rapidly that current information is hard to come by. Depositors
will look for signals in the behavior of other depositors. If other depositors are withdrawing their funds, less informed
depositors will simply follow suit.
71. In fact, today there are so many alternatives to deposits that banks no longer have a monopoly on short-term
liquid investments. See Growing Pains, supra note 56, at 522-23 (discussing growth of deposit substitutes).
72. See Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 327, 338 (1983).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 143-48. Some of these attributes of the deposit market are present in other
short-term debt markets, notably the commercial paper market. Therefore, the failure or default of one commercial paper
issuer might be expected to have similar spillover effects on the entire commercial paper market. In the past, this has been
the case. See W. MELToN, INStDE THE FED: MAKING MONErARY PoucY 157-58 (1985) (1970 bankruptcy of Penn Central,
which had $82 million of commercial paper outstanding, led to run on commercial paper market). This danger of panic
has led to a "flight to quality" by commercial paper investors, effectively foreclosing the market to all but the most
creditworthy issuers. Id. at 29. In contrast, the deposit market remains open to all banks. Moreover, many of the most
active marketers of deposits are banks in precarious financial positions. See infra text accompanying note 141.
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posit runs at other, better managed institutions. 74 Publicity in 1989 about the crisis in
the thrift industry and doubts about the solvency of the thrift insurance fund led to
deposit runs at many savings associations although the problems affecting the thrift
industry were hardly new. 75
Although panic runs are rare today compared with the deposit runs of the 1930s,
the primary deterrent is government regulation designed to prevent panics. This bank
"safety net" includes deposit insurance, Federal Reserve lending to institutions
experiencing liquidity crises, 76 and bank failure policy itself. Each of these devices
has the effect of protecting depositors from losses in the event of a liquidity crisis and
failure, thereby dulling their incentive to join deposit runs. Whether in the absence of
any part of this regulation, deposit runs once again would become common is a
hypothesis that even critics of bank failure policy are reluctant to test. 77
Thus, bank failure is a more complex phenomenon than simply a way to elim-
inate bad banks. Banks fail for a variety of reasons, both firm-specific and systemic.
More important, the inability of depositors to identify firm-specific causes for all
bank failures means that bank runs will not necessarily be confined to bad banks. This
problem of erroneous depositor discipline complicates the goals of bank failure
policy.
B. Bank Failure and Insolvency Procedures
Failure even of a badly managed firm does not automatically result in the
efficient redistribution of its assets to more desirable uses. Rather, failure begins a
long and complex bargaining process as the business is reorganized or sold and the
claims of its various stakeholders are balanced. This process imposes considerable
costs on the parties to the reorganization proceeding and on others affected by the
failure, including customers, employees, and the public. 78 Lengthy proceedings re-
74. These runs were caused by questions as to the solvency of state deposit insurance funds generally. See Kilborn,
World Markets React to Ills of U.S. Banks, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1985, at D9, col. 5.
75. See McTague, Thrifts Report $45 Billion Drop in Deposits Since May 1988, Am. Banker, Mar. 15, 1989, at
1, col. 2. Ironically, thrift regulators blamed the outflows not on bad publicity about the thrift industry, but on rate
competition from money market funds. Even if this were true, it only confirms the unpredictability of the deposit market.
At a time when multiple thrift failures were bringing into question the solvency of the thrift deposit insurance fund,
depositors might have been expected to have already abandoned thrifts regardless of rates.
76. See 12 U.S.C. § 347(b), 411-12 (1982).
77. Most critics of bank failure policy admit that there is a need for deposit insurance and central bank lending to
deter deposit runs. See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1158; Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, The Regulation of Banks
and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. Rev. 301, 312-18 (1987). Yet bank failure policy performs exactly the same
function. For example, the regulators' announcement that any disposition of ailing Continental Illinois would preserve the
claims of all depositors and creditors of the bank and bank holding company was intended to halt a deposit run. See supra
note 42. Moreover, as a way of deterring runs, bank failure policy may have fewer negative side effects than central bank
lending, which provides liquidity to inefficient banks and their inefficient managers even after the market has refused to
fund them. Dispositions of failed banks that protect all depositors at least ensure that some discipline is imposed on
management and shareholders. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
78. For a discussion of these costs, see Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization,
83 CoLum. L. REv. 528, 529 (1983). At least one study has suggested that the legal and administrative costs of corporate
bankruptcy are less significant than is commonly assumed. See Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J. FiN.
337, 343 (1971) (study of 11 railroad bankruptcies found that bankruptcy costs averaged only I% of firm value 84 months
prior to bankruptcy). But this study was concerned only with the firm's expenses, not losses experienced by customers,
employees, and the government. Moreover, the study took into account only out-of-pocket expenses, such as
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quire considerable investment of judicial time. Investors' funds are tied up until the
reorganization or liquidation is complete, preventing their immediate reinvestment in
more productive uses. Customers and employees with an ongoing relationship with
the failed firm experience uncertainty. Customers may be forced to establish rela-
tionships with new businesses. Employees may become demoralized and seek new
employment.
In comparision with corporate bankruptcy and reorganization procedures, bank
failure policy actually may be more efficient in facilitating the rapid transfer of
resources to productive uses. First, regulatory dispositions of failed banks generally
result in the prompt removal of shareholders and management from the bargaining
process. Whether the bank is liquidated or its assets and liabilities are transferred to
another bank, its managers immediately lose their jobs. Shareholders have no say in
the disposition of the bank and are relegated to the FDIC's liquidation proceedings to
recover any part of their claims. 79 Even if the bank receives open-bank assistance, the
FDIC may fire incumbent management and insist that shareholders reduce their
interests in the bank.80 Thus, the FDIC's power to determine the fate of a failed bank
and to provide or withhold financial assistance to a failing bank enables the FDIC to
impose solutions on management and shareholders that may not be possible in cor-
porate bankruptcy.8 '
Second, some bank failure resolution procedures facilitate an orderly and rapid
disposition of the failed bank's valuable resources. In a federally assisted merger,
depositors' and other creditors' claims are assumed virtually without interruption by
the acquiring bank.8 2 Creditors do not have to find new investments that offer com-
parable rates of return. Depositors have uninterrupted access to their funds. More-
over, the assuming bank usually purchases some or all of the failed bank's performing
assets. Thus, lending relationships are not terminated; borrowers simply make their
interest payments to a new bank. In contrast, when a failed bank is liquidated, many
loans will be called, forcing borrowers to find new sources of credit. Borrowers may
legal and professional fees, trustee fees and filing fees, and not the indirect costs of bankruptcy, such as lost human
capital, lost sales, and higher financing costs.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 25-35.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
81. In corporate reorganization, incumbent management frequently continues to operate the firm until a final
settlement is reached, which may leave management in power for several years. Moreover, prior to the commencement
of formal bankruptcy proceedings, shareholders have little incentive to compromise their claims. Creditors often are
unable to force prebankruptcy recapitalizations or changes of control due to inadequate bargaining power, conflicting
interests, and even legal impediments to altering the terms of their own investments. See generally Roe, The Voting
Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232 (1987) (Trust Indenture Act provision prohibiting binding vote by
bondholders to change core indenture terms inhibits pre-bankruptcy workouts).
Of course, not even the FDIC can always force shareholders and managers to accept a prebankruptcy reorganization.
For example, when the FDIC insisted that a bank holding company contribute nonbank resources to its ailing subsidiary
banks as a condition to receiving open-bank financial assistance, bank holding company management simply refused. See
Klinkerman, MCorp, Raising Stakes, Hints at Bankruptcy This Week, Am. Banker, Nov. 1, 1988, at 2, col. 1. Ultimately,
the regulators had to close the banks, transferring their assets to a bridge bank pending sale. As a result, the holding
company lost control of over 80 % of its assets. See McTague, FDIC Sees Quick Sale of Closed MCorp Units. $15.4
Billion in Assets Seized After Deposit Run, Am. Banker, Mar. 30., 1989, at 1, col. 4.
82. The FDIC tries to arrange the sale before the bank is closed so that the bank can be closed and reopened under
new ownership overnight. See Bovenzi & Murton, supra note 2, at 2-3. If the FDIC provides open-bank assistance, the
bank's ongoing relationships with creditors and borrowers are unaffected.
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be unable to renegotiate the terms of their loans when their creditor is a receiver in
liquidation.
Finally, the FDIC's discretion to choose alternative dispositions of failed banks
generally is constrained by the resulting cost to the insurance fund. 83 Open-bank
assistance or transfer of the failed bank's assets and liabilities to a healthy bank is
preferable to a liquidation if the amount of financial assistance required to arrange
such a disposition is less than the cost of paying off insured depositors and liquidating
assets. 84 Thus, the FDIC is required to identify and implement the most efficient
solution to any particular bank failure.8 5
C. Bank Failure and Deposit Insurance
Critics of bank failure policy still complain that the FDIC has too much discre-
tion to arrange alternative dispositions of failed banks. They see little need for
extensive regulatory involvement in bank failure, especially the FDIC's efforts to
arrange mergers or to recapitalize failing banks. Such efforts are particularly objec-
tionable when they result in the protection of what are viewed as undeserving groups
of stakeholders, such as uninsured depositors. These depositors should be sophisti-
cated enough to protect themselves from bank failure and, if they have invested in a
failing bank, should bear the consequences of their own actions. 86
This criticism fails to take account of the legal and political constraints that have
contributed to the development of current bank failure policy. Far from exercising
unbounded discretion in determining the fate of failed banks, the FDIC authority
actually is subject to limits that do not affect a bankruptcy court overseeing a cor-
porate reorganization. Further, whether or not regulatory dispositions of failed banks
protect undeserving depositors often is beside the point. Bank failure policy is not
determined by weighing the relative claims of different bank stakeholders for
83. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (Supp. V 1987), amended by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 217 (limiting financial
assistance to, or to facilitate the merger of, a failed bank to amounts not in excess of the cost of liquidation and payment
of insured depositors). In calculating the cost of financial assistance, the FDIC must take into account both immediate cash
outlays and long-term obligations as well as any lost tax revenues as a result of tax benefits provided to facilitate the
acquisition of the failing bank. See FIRREA, supra note 8, § 217.
84. The FDIC can ignore this cost test if it makes a determination that the continued operation of the failing bank
is essential to provide adequate banking services in its community. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (Supp. V 1987), amended by
FIRREA, supra note 8. § 217. Despite this loophole, the FDIC has made relatively few "essentiality" determinations.
Moreover, in some of these cases, the FDIC's disposition ultimately has turned out to be less costly than liquidation. See
Sprague, FDIC Is Less Inclined to Genuine Bailouts than FSLIC, Am. Banker, Mar. 15, 1989, at 4, col. 2.
85. The FDIC is accorded virtually unlimited discretion to determine which disposition is most cost-effective. See
12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (Supp. V 1987), amended by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 217 ("No assistance shall be provided
... in an amount in excess of that amount which the Corporation determines to be reasonably necessary to save the cost
of liquidating, including paying the insured accounts of, such insured bank" (emphasis added)). Moreover, the impos-
sibility of predicting the actual cost of liquidating a bank, including the prices at which its assets eventually can be sold,
creates the risk that the FDIC will err in applying the cost test. Nevertheless, the FDIC has strong incentives to avoid
deliberate or accidental miscalculations, since costly errors are likely to have a negative impact on the agency's future
funding and authority. This was the fate of the now defunct Federal Home Loan Bank Board following its perceived
mishandling of various thrift failures. See, e.g., Rowe, Such a Deal! Is the Bank Board's Southwest Plan Too Good to
Be True? Am. Banker, Nov. 17, 1988, at 6, col. 1 (criticizing federal financial assistance plan for failed thrifts as overly
generous to private acquirors); see also infra text accompanying note 97.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
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protection. Rather, bank failure policy increasingly has a single aim: to minimize the
effect of bank failure on the insurance fund.
Deposit insurance alters the stakes in a bank failure in a fundamental fashion.
Even critics of bank failure policy admit that, at a minimum, deposit insurance must
continue to protect some class of depositors. 87 Although the original concept of
protecting small savers may appear paternalistic (particularly when those savers
include investors with 100,000 dollars in a single bank) or unnecessary (when there
are other more effective ways to protect small savers), deposit insurance has become
a permanent part of the banking system. Moreover, it benefits the banking industry
as well as the depositor. Deposit insurance enables banks to offer relatively low
premiums and still attract funds in today's competitive liability market. 88 It reassures
depositors who otherwise might react to bad publicity about foreign lending, bank
fraud, and the thrift industry crisis by removing their funds from the bank, or pres-
suring Congress for more stringent regulation of the banking industry.
Yet the very success of deposit insurance has created its own risk. Any doubts
about the solvency of the insurance fund can spark a severe negative reaction from
depositors. When very few banks failed, the strength of the insurance fund was not
in doubt. Yet recent questions about the solvency of comparable funds, such as the
state guarantee funds in Ohio89 and the federal thrift insurance fund, 90 have suggested
that deposit insurance funds are not bottomless and that any fear about the solvency
of an insurance fund can trigger deposit runs.
Therefore, like any reserve fund, the deposit insurance fund ultimately is limited
in the guarantee it can offer depositors. 9t This constraint has shaped bank failure
policy. The best way to protect a reserve fund is to use it as little as possible. Bank
failure policy has aimed to arrange dispositions of failed banks that require less cash
outlay than paying off insured depositors out of the insurance fund. 92 Of course,
unlike private insurers, the deposit insurance fund does not have to depend entirely
on premiums from insured parties for funding. 93 The government always can print
additional money or raise taxes to bail out the fund. 94 Nevertheless, political con-
87. See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1158. There is disagreement over which depositors are deserving of
insurance protection. See supra note 13 (proposals to cut back on present S100,000 per depositor coverage).
88. Given the relative safety of recent deposit substitutes such as money market mutual funds, this competitive
advantage provided banks by deposit insurance may be waning. See supra text accompanying note 71.
89. See supra text accompanying note 74.
90. See supra text accompanying note 75.
91. Although this problem is recognized with respect to private insurance, is is assumed that government insurance
can offer an unconditional guarantee. See, e.g., Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 63, at 413 (citing this reason for
maintaining government rather than private sector deposit insurance). This presumes that the government will always back
up its guarantee by increased taxes, no matter how distortionary. Id. at 416. Ideally, once the nature of this unconditional
guarantee is understood, it will never have to be called upon. Depositors who know their investments are protected in the
event of bank closing have no reason to participate in runs. Thus, an equilibrium can be achieved in which the
government's credible promise to pay assures that the promise will never be tested. Id. Nevertheless, recent financial
crises experienced by government insurance funds suggest that this equilibrium is easily upset.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85 (cost test for choosing among alternative dispositions of failed
banks).
93. Technically, deposit insurance is intended to be funded through contributions from insured banks. For 55 years
(until 1988), the bank insurance fund's annual income, derived from premiums and returns on investment of reserves, did
exceed its annual expenses. See Rehm, supra note 8, at 13, col. I (FDIC experienced its first annual loss in 1988).
94. See supra note 91.
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straints may make these options undesirable or impossible. In requesting additional
funds, the deposit insurance fund must compete with other government-funded pro-
grams and agencies. In this competition, the insurance fund may not necessarily be
perceived as the most deserving recipient. 95 This political reality was demonstrated
by the lengthy bargaining process required before a solution was found to the thrift
industry crisis. Congress was reluctant to solve the thrift insurance fund's financial
problems by measures that would further increase the federal deficit. 96
The FDIC, which is in charge of administering the deposit insurance fund, is
likely to be sensitive to these political constraints. No regulator wants to be remem-
bered as having begged Congress to raise taxes or increase the federal deficit to bail
out the insurance fund. Such a request, even if granted, will have a negative effect
on the agency's ability to obtain future funding for personnel and internal adminis-
trative expenses, as well as on the allocation of power among competing regulators.
The FDIC already shares responsibility for federal regulation of the banking industry
with two other agencies, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the
Federal Reserve Board. The FDIC's chances of gaining additional supervisory power
at the expense of its rivals will be injured if the agency's administration of the
insurance fund results in its insolvency. 97 Thus, the FDIC has an incentive to min-
imize the cost of bank failure to the insurance fund.98
This goal of minimizing the cost of failure may frustrate attempts to use the bank
failure process to achieve other goals, such as punishing investors in bad banks.
Assume Bank A has failed, leaving quantities of worthless assets. Bank A purchased
these assets with uninsured deposits held by sophisticated investors who deliberately
chose to put their funds in a risky bank in order to earn high returns. This bank may
seem like a good candidate for a liquidation, as a result of which uninsured depositors
will bear losses. Yet the bank may also have so many insured deposits that paying off
insured depositors' claims could exhaust the insurance fund. Thus, the FDIC may not
have the luxury of using liquidation to impose discipline on uninsured depositors.
In this case, the flexibility of the FDIC to experiment with alternative solutions
may enable the FDIC both to save money and to punish uninsured depositors. For
example, the FDIC could arrange an insured deposit transfer in which only insured
deposits and selected assets are transferred intact to an assuming bank.99 Neverthe-
less, even this solution may not be possible for every bank failure. Some purchasers
may want to assume uninsured as well as insured deposits. There may be no bidders
95. Since the direct beneficiaries of the fund are private depository institutions and their investors, there may be
reluctance to use public funds to rescue private gamblers.
96. See Garsson, Gramm Fightsfor Off-Budget S & L Rescue, Am. Banker, July 31, 1989, at 1, col. I (debate over
source of funds needed to recapitalize thrift insurance fund delayed adoption of FIRREA).
97. For example, as a result of the problems besetting the thrift insurance fund, Congress abolished the federal
agencies responsible for administering thrift insurance, transferring the insurance function to the FDIC. See FIRREA,
supra note 8, § 401 (abolishing FSLIC and FHLBB).
98. This incentive will be strengthened as the FDIC's power grows following the consolidation of the bank and
savings association insurance funds under the FDIC's control. See supra note 97.
99. See supra text accompanying note 35. In this ease, uninsured depositors are relegated to the proceeds of
liquidation of the bank's remaining assets.
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at all for some failing banks, forcing a choice between liquidation and open-bank
assistance.
Of course, if the FDIC's failure resolution techniques themselves result in riskier
banks, then any short-term cost reduction is counterproductive. The FDIC will be
saving money today that will have to be spent tomorrow as even more banks fail. Yet
a bank failure policy that reduces outflows from the insurance fund has consequences
beyond simply reducing the cost of any single bank failure. If as a result of this policy
the insurance fund remains strong, depositors have less reason to join deposit runs. 10
As a result, fewer banks may fail. Moreover, the danger that current bank failure
policy is sacrificing the opportunity to impose market discipline on depositors or
other bank investors is of concern only if such discipline is likely to produce healthier
banks. In fact, encouraging effective market discipline may be an impossible task for
bank failure policy.
III. THE PROBLEM OF MARKET DISCIPLINE
The goals of bank failure policy would be easier to achieve if fewer banks failed.
Critics of current bank failure policy often blame that policy itself for removing
incentives for healthy banks to avoid failure. In their view, if bank failure policy were
altered, bank investors-shareholders, depositors, and other creditors-would have
more incentives to monitor bank condition and impose discipline on bank manage-
ment to limit excessive risk-taking that leads to failure. 0 1
Today's bank failure policy cannot afford to be concerned exclusively with
creating incentives for market discipline of healthy banks. ' 0 2 Yet even if it could be
the sole aim of bank failure policy, encouraging market discipline would not neces-
sarily result in fewer bank failures. Shareholders already have reason to discipline
their banks, but they have had little effect on currently inflated rates of bank failure.
The discipline of uninsured depositors and other creditors is unlikely to be any more
effective in limiting risk than the weak discipline imposed by their fellow debtholders
on nonbanking companies. Finally, although insured depositors are not expected to
exert meaningful discipline, their actions still interfere with the disciplinary efforts of
other bank investors.
A. Shareholder Discipline
Bank shareholders are no better off as a result of bank failure than shareholders
in any failed enterprise. In fact, in most banks, the large volume of creditors' claims,
particularly those of depositors, means that shareholders ordinarily can expect to
recover less in bank failure than in the failure of many nonbank businesses. 0 3
Whether the bank's assets are liquidated or transferred to an acquiring bank, very
100. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 63, at 416.
101. See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1225-26.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 92-99.
103. See supra text accompanying note 30.
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little will be left to satisfy shareholders. Thus, shareholders already have incentives
to exert discipline on bank managers to avoid failure.
Yet most observers would agree that shareholder discipline has not sufficiently
deterred opportunism, excessive risk-taking, or other managerial conduct that leads
to bank failure. This may mean that bank managers can afford to ignore the signals
sent by the securities market. Alternatively, bank managers may be reading share-
holder signals correctly, but shareholders may not be insisting on more risk-averse
management of banks. In this case, shareholder discipline of banks may be working
as well as shareholder discipline of any firm, but such discipline will not lead to fewer
bank failures. 104
1. Can Bank Management Afford to Ignore Market Signals?
In order to be effective, shareholder discipline must have an impact on bank
managers, who set the bank's investment strategy. The case for market discipline
assumes that bank managers have adequate incentives to read and respond to market
signals. If investors are selling their shares or refusing to buy newly issued stock,
bank managers will react by altering their investment strategies to prevent further
declines in share value.
Whether bank managers are sensitive to declines in share value is subject to
question. Lower share values affect the price at which banks can raise new equity
capital. Yet this may have little impact on bank management. 0 5 Most banks depend
for funding primarily on deposits, including insured deposits. So long as these de-
posits remain available, management can tolerate depressed share prices or even the
unwillingness of shareholders to buy newly issued bank stock. 106 Historically, equity
levels at many banks have been very low. t0 7 Bank regulation has had to mandate
minimum equity capital to asset ratios of four percent.' 0 8 This suggests that bank
managers may be able to ignore the risk preferences of shareholders. 10 9
104. This discussion of shareholder discipline begs the question why managers require discipline in the first place.
Put another way, why are managers likely to engage in inefficient investment strategies that fail to maximize firm value?
The most common answer is that agency costs involved in monitoring and controlling corporate managers allow those
managers to pursue their own goals rather than those of the firm's risk-bearers. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Market discipline, if
successful, provides a means of more closely aligning managers' and risk-bearers' preferences. But market discipline does
not ensure that managers will pursue less risky investment strategies. In fact, at least until the firm is in financial distress,
managers are likely to be more risk averse than their shareholders. See infra text accompanying note 114.
105, For any firm, lower share prices do not necessarily prevent capital formation. The firm may simply have to
issue more shares to raise the necessary amount of capital. See Bebehuck, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate
Law: The Desirable Constraints on CharterAmendments, 102 HAxv. L. REv. 1820, 1845 (1989). Yet issuing more shares
at lower prices may increase the administrative costs of the securities offering. The firm may have difficulty placing a
large number of shares. It may have to make multiple trips to the equity market, increasing its legal and regulatory costs.
106, If depositors were concerned about equity levels at banks, they might avoid banks that the equity market
disfavored. Nevertheless, the protection afforded by deposit insurance allows at least insured depositors to be less
concerned about excessive leverage than debtholders in nonbank corporations. Moreover, equity levels have been so low
at banks in general compared with nonbank corporations that investors concerned about leverage would have to abandon
banks altogether.
107. See Walker, Regulating Capital at the Margin, 5 IssUES IN BANK REG. 35, 36 (Autumn 1981).
108. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 208; 225 (1989).
109. In addition, managers may have difficulty interpreting market signals. Managers may focus on short-term
investor reactions to their conduct and ignore longer-term factors that may affect investor response. Market reactions may
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Many proponents of market discipline agree that, for any firm, the stock market
alone is an inefficient source of discipline on managerial discretion. More effective
discipline is provided by the market for corporate control or the managerial labor
market. 110 Shareholder disaffection with a firm, resulting in depressed share prices,
will lead to a takeover by more efficient managers who can maximize the firm's
value."' If managerial compensation is tied to share performance through stock
option plans or bonuses, managers' and shareholders' interests can be more closely
aligned. In addition, superior stock performance may improve a manager's chance of
obtaining a better paying position at another company."12
These arguments suggest that, in the long run, management may not be able to
ignore market signals. " 3 But they do not prove that market discipline will cause bank
managers to avoid actions that increase the risk of bank failure. Even without the
incentives provided by the market for corporate control and the managerial labor
market, managers have good reason to fear bank failure. Bank failure causes man-
agers to lose their jobs, and may affect their ability to find new jobs. 1 4 In contrast,
managers can protect themselves from financial losses following a takeover by ne-
gotiating favorable termination arrangements. Moreover, loss of a high paying man-
agerial position as a result of business failure has more serious financial consequences
for managers than a decline in the value of their securities holdings.
Thus, even without owning shares or otherwise having an interest in the per-
formance of the company's stock, managers have a significant stake in the continued
solvency of their firms. This suggests that managers already have a reason to avoid
conduct that increases the risk of failure. Aligning managerial and shareholder in-
terests is not necessary to make bank managers take fewer risks. In fact, as will be
shown in the next section, it may make them take more risks.
be difficult to read, and subject to individual interpretation. A two-point drop in stock price following announcement of
loan problems may be viewed as highly negative by one manager, but more positive than expected by another. Thus, even
if managers are concerned with market responses, market signals may provide poor guidance to managers in making
specific corporate decisions, such as choosing among investments with varying degrees of risk. For a discussion of this
problem in the context of market responses to automobile recalls, see Marcus & Bromiley, The Rationale for Regulation:
Shareholder Losses under Various Assumptions about Managerial Cognition, 4 J. LAw, EcoN. & ORe. 357, 361-63
(1988).
110. These two disciplinary mechanisms have been termed "control by displacement" and "control by incentive."
See Williamson, Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm, in ECONoMIc POLICY AND THE REGULATiON OF CORORATE
SEcURrmIs 281, 298-316 (H. Manne ed. 1969). -
111. See Manne, supra note 17, at 112; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1165-74 (1981).
112. See Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcoN. 288, 298 (1980).
113. Of course, these disciplinary mechanisms may not work as well for banks as for other firms. For example,
critics of bank regulation argue that banks are effectively insulated from the threat of a change in control. Yet the current
active bank takeover market refutes this claim. See infra text accompanying notes 163-64.
114. Association with a failed bank may damage a manager's reputation for skillful management. Moreover, the job
market for senior bank executives may not be active, particularly if the banking industry generally is experiencing
financial problems. See Coffee, Shareholders versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MIcH. L. Rev. 1,
17 (1986) (senior corporate executives cannot assume the existence of an extemal market rate of return applicable to their
labor).
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2. Are Bank Shareholders Risk Averse?
Bank managers already have significant incentives to avoid bank failure. Long-
term employment relationships give managers a large and often undiversifiable stake
in their bank. "15 If managerial compensation includes stock options or other perfor-
mance-related benefits, managers' stake in the continued solvency of their firm is
only increased. 116 Moreover, managers are not winners in bank failure. Regardless of
regulatory disposition, failure results in lost jobs, causing financial injury as well as
damage to the managers' reputations."17
If managers are already risk averse, why is market discipline necessary to
restrain overly risky managerial behavior? Managers have reason to avoid high risk
projects that may lead to failure. They also have reason to monitor their fellow
employees to prevent opportunistic behavior that destroys firm value. Nevertheless,
banks are still failing.
One explanation may be that, in taking risks, bank managers are responding to
the preferences of their shareholders. 118 Shareholders are less risk averse than bank
managers or bank regulators might like them to be. Several factors account for
shareholders' ability to tolerate bank risk and even bank failure. First, diversification
allows shareholders to accept more risk in any individual investment than is accept-
able to undiversified investors. Portfolio theory suggests that shareholders can protect
themselves from firm-specific risk by investing in different stocks whose returns are
negatively correlated." 9 Through this diversification, investors ensure that, at any
time, losses from one investment will be offset by gains from other investments.
Investors also can reduce overall portfolio risk by buying some low risk assets such
as treasury securities. This suggests that diversified shareholders may welcome ad-
ditional risk-taking by bank management if it offers the prospect of high returns. 120
115. See id. at 16-24.
116. See id. at 18.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 113-14.
1 IS. There are several possible explanations for why bank managers might overcome their personal risk aversion.
Excessive leverage, although reducing the relative importance of equity as a funding source, may help to align managerial
risk preferences more closely with those of shareholders. For example, it has been argued with respect to corporate
leverage generally that, through leverage, managers are bonding themselves to accept shareholders' risk preferences, since
firms with high debt-to-equity ratios must depend on funding by the equity market for new projects. See Coffee, supra
note 114, at 28 (discussing this pro-leverage argument). Although, unlike other firms, banks can rely on a continuous
supply of deposits for funding, recent regulatory requirements that banks maintain minimum ratios of equity to assets may
be forcing banks to resort regularly to the equity market. This in turn may be forcing bank managers to become more
sensitive to shareholders' risk preferences.
Alternatively, high leverage means that bank managers must invest in increasingly high yielding and high risk
projects in order to pay themselves salaries after paying off debt charges. As bank risk increases, so will the risk premiums
that must be offered to attract depositors, forcing managers to accept even more risky projects in order to maintain net
profits. Thus, it may actually be the pressure of deposit market, rather than the stock market, that is causing bank
managers to become less risk averse. See infra note 121.
119. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 123-26 (2d ed. 1984).
120. Of course, accepting high risk projects is not the only reason that banks fail. Banks also fail because of
employee theft or fraud, slack or other inefficient managerial behavior. Since these inefficiencies will not produce high
returns, they will not be welcomed by shareholders (or risk averse managers). Yet shareholder discipline has not prevented
this type of risk-taking either. Diversification itself may remove incentives for individual shareholders to invest in the
costly, firm-specific monitoring that is required to detect internal management problems before they result in failure. Such
monitoring is more efficiently performed by potential corporate raiders who intend to improve performance by removing
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Second, the high ratios of depositors and other debtholders to equityholders in
most banks may contribute to shareholders' preference for more aggressive risk-
taking by bank management. As the level of debt, and of debt servicing charges,
grows, management must invest in increasingly high yielding projects in order to
ensure some return for shareholders after debt charges are paid. Shareholders do not
want their banks to invest solely in treasury securities and other "safe" investments
that yield only enough to pay off depositors. They prefer that their banks invest in
more risky loans with higher yields. The higher the expected return on an investment,
the more profits will be available for shareholders. Thus, shareholders' preference for
high returns may put pressure on management to choose high risk investments.' 2 1
Thus, there is no reason to assume that, because banks fail, shareholder disci-
pline is not working. In fact, the current rate of failure may be acceptable to the equity
market. Improving the sensitivity of bank managers to the discipline of this market
is likely to lessen, not strengthen, these managers' aversion to risk. Perhaps this is
why proponents of market discipline ignore the role of bank shareholders in imposing
discipline on bank managers. Instead, they appear to agree with the bank regulators
that the current rate of failure imposes unacceptable costs on other bank stakeholders,
especially the deposit insurance fund.
B. Depositor Discipline
Critics of bank failure policy put their faith in depositors and other bank creditors
to exert market discipline that will actually prevent bank failure.12 2 This reliance on
debtholders to discipline management is somewhat curious at a time when the failure
of corporate debtholders generally to constrain management risk-taking is becoming
evident. 123 Theoretically, debtholders discipline management risk-taking in three
ways. First, debtholders can protect themselves from future increases in risk by
negotiating restrictive covenants that directly constrain management's discretion to
alter the risk posture of the firm. These covenants may prevent management from
pledging assets, incurring new debt, or paying excessive dividends.124
incumbent management. Yet, as will be discussed, serious management misconduct that is likely to cause failure may
deter these raiders. See infra text accompanying notes 177-80.
121. See Guttentag & Herring, Credit Rationing and Financial Disorder, 39 J. FiN. 1359, 1369 (1984). This
pressure increases as the bank begins to experience financial difficulties, at which point management also has an interest
in gambling on high risk, high return investments in the hope of preventing salary cuts, see supra note 118, and loss of
employment if the bank fails. For example, assume a bank has $1000 of debt and only $100 of income. Management has
the opportunity to make a loan that has only a 10 % chance of yielding $2000. This investment will be attractive to
shareholders, who will receive nothing if the investment is not made, the bank becomes insolvent and the creditors take
the $100. It also may be attractive to the bank's managers, who will lose theirjobs if the bank becomes insolvent. At best,
the risky investment will keep the bank open. At worst, it will at least postpone failure.
122. See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1199 ("Uninsured depositors are a valuable source of market discipline
for banks").
123. See Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 Du.E L.J. 92,
135-59; McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CoRP. L. 205, 234-45 (1988). These observers have pointed
to the failure of bondholders, through restrictive covenants or otherwise, to halt wealth transfers from bondholders to
stockholders as a result of corporate restructurings, takeovers, and buyouts. The barriers to effective debtholder discipline
are only magnified in the context of bank-depositor relations.
124. For examples of these and other restrictive debt covenants, see McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Gov-
ernance, 41 Bus. LAw. 413, 424-27 (1986).
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Second, debtholders can insist that the premium that they receive to lend to the
firm reflects the risk that management will accept more risky projects during the term
of their loan. Firms that pose a greater than average risk of unforeseeable alterations
in risk structure will command higher than average risk premiums from the market. 125
Finally, if the risk associated with an investment is so great that debtholders cannot
protect themselves through covenants or risk premiums, debtholders can refuse to
renew their loans or to buy new debt. Since this decision deprives the firm of capital,
it imposes direct discipline on management's discretion to invest in new risky
projects. 126
Yet none of these devices has had much effect on bank risk. Deposit contracts
seldom if ever contain restrictive covenants. 2 7 Although some banks must offer risk
premiums to attract deposits, high premiums have not deterred these banks from
making new risky investments with depositors' funds. Moreover, very risky banks
continue to be able to attract funds almost until the day they fail. Depositor discipline
appears no more effective than shareholder discipline in punishing excessive risk-
taking.
1. Why Depositors Do Not Demand Restrictive Covenants
For risk-averse debtholders, contractual covenants would seem to offer distinct
advantages. Debtholders are concerned about unpredictable changes in risk levels
during the term of their investments. Once the premium on its debt has been set, a
firm has an incentive to invest in high risk projects that, if successful, will produce
returns for shareholders in excess of fixed debt charges. 128 If shareholder discipline
is effective, bank management will feel pressure to engage in a high risk investment
strategy in order to improve returns.
Restrictive covenants can place direct limits on the ability of firms to take certain
kinds of risks, such as incurring substantial quantities of additional debt, pledging
assets, or selling subsidiaries. Firms may have an incentive to accept these kinds of
restrictions in order to lower their cost of funding. In the absence of direct controls
on managerial discretion, debtholders may require large risk premiums to compensate
for the possibility of significant future alterations in firm risk. Firms may be able to
differentiate themselves from other, more risky borrowers by agreeing to bond them-
selves to maintain a risk-averse investment strategy. If the cost of such bonding,
including forgone investment opportunities, is less than the risk premium that the firm
otherwise would have to pay its debtholders, then the firm may choose to accept
restrictive covenants.
125. Risk premiums also compensate debtholders for foreseeable risks associated with the debt instrument at the
time of its issuance.
126. See Fama & Jensen, supra note 72, at 338.
127. This absence of covenants is not unique to deposits. Other short-term debt securities such as commercial paper
also are issued with very few if any covenants. See McDaniel, supra note 124, at 424-26. As in the case of deposits, the
short terms of these investments make contractual covenants unnecessary. See infra text accompanying notes 137-38.
128. See supra text accompanying note 121.
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Why then are contractual protections so rare in the deposit market? 29 The
regulatory protections enjoyed by depositors provide an incomplete explanation.
Deposit insurance protects some small investors, but even uninsured depositors do
not contract for additional protection. 130 The absence of negotiated deposit contracts
suggests that depositors may not want or need contractual protection. The cost of
negotiating contracts may exceed the expected benefits in terms of the effectiveness
of restrictive covenants. Moreover, other more efficient techniques of depositor
self-protection may exist.
The cost of negotiating contractual covenants is far higher for the depositor than
for the average corporate debtholder. Deposits are issued almost continuously with
different maturities and rates. A 100,000 dollar certificate of deposit is a very dif-
ferent investment from a checking account.' 3 ' The covenants which each depositor
would require are so different that no single agent could bargain effectively on behalf
of all depositors. Separate negotiations between each depositor and her bank would
be prohibitively expensive, and would result in complex and possibly conflicting
contractual requirements for the bank.132
Moreover, the effectiveness of contractual covenants in preventing bank risk-
taking is subject to question. Restrictive covenants often focus on management's
discretion to acquire, substitute, or dispose of assets. Typical covenants restrict the
sale of assets, prevent excessive payouts of assets to shareholders in the form of
dividends, and impose various other asset maintenance requirements. 133 Covenants
restricting the issuance of additional senior or secured debt also seek to preserve
debtholders' claims to the firm's assets. 134 These covenants provide a way for debt-
holders to exert some control over the firm's future investment policy. Ideally, debt
contracts would require managers to make only those investments that maximize firm
value. But such contracts would be prohibitively expensive for debtholders to monitor
and enforce. 135 Instead, standard asset-related covenants set limits on particular in-
vestment strategies, such as asset substitution, that can decrease a firm's value.
129. For the past two decades, even long-term corporate bonds have contained few if any restrictive covenants. See
McDaniel, supra note 124, at 424-26. Apparently, issuers have convinced investors that the cost of contracting exceeds
the expected benefits in terms of risk control. Recently, concern over high firm leverage resulting from restructurings has
led to the reemergence of some debt restrictions aimed at discouraging highly leveraged transactions. See Clemens, Poison
Debt: The New Takeover Defense, 42 Bus. LAW. 747, 751 (1987) (describing "poison puts" that allow the holder to put
the debt back to the issuer at a premium redemption price upon the occurrence of certain restructuring events). Alter-
natively, bondholders may now be protecting themselves by demanding higher rates and shorter maturities. See Bratton,
supra note 123, at 157 (noting decline in durations of junk bonds). These are the very devices that depositors and other
short-term debtholders rely on to protect themselves in lieu of covenanting. See infra text accompanying notes 137-38.
130. In some states, depositors are granted a statutory preference over some other general creditors in a liquidation.
See supra note 27. Yet this may not afford much protection if the failed bank has few valuable assets.
13 1. See Banking, supra note 11, at 134-39 (distinguishing "involuntary depositors," such as holders of checking
accounts, for whom risk and return are less significant in choosing a bank than factors such as convenience, from
sophisticated "investor-depositors").
132. See Still Banking, supra note 11, at 246.
133. Such covenants may require the maintenance of particular properties, impose minimum working capital
requirements, or require the firm to remain in particular businesses. For an analysis of the functions of these and other
typical covenants, see Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. EcoN. 117,
124-46 (1979).
134. See id. at 127.
135. See id. at 130.
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Yet, for most banks, these kinds of covenants are both unduly restrictive and
ineffective in controlling risk. Bank assets are constantly being replaced and often
have no easily determinable current market value. 136 Thus, asset maintenance re-
quirements are impossible to monitor and enforce. Moreover, these requirements
provide very little real protection against a liquidity crisis. Once a deposit run begins,
a bank's assets may be depleted so rapidly that remaining depositors have no oppor-
tunity to enforce contractual asset maintenance requirements. In any case, liquidity
crises are rarely within management's control. Restrictive covenants cannot prevent
deposit runs from occurring.
Finally, the liquidity of deposits removes any incentive for depositors to incur
the costs of drafting and monitoring compliance with contractual covenants. Most
deposits are either withdrawable upon demand or short-term. A short-term depositor
has the opportunity at regular intervals to make a new investment decision: she can
either recover her principal from the bank or renew her deposit. t37 If bank risk has
increased, the depositor can simply withdraw her funds, or insist on a higher risk
premium before reinvesting.
If the depositor chooses to withdraw her funds, she has the option of reinvesting
in another bank's deposits or in a variety of fungible short-term investments, includ-
ing treasury securities, commercial paper, and money market mutual funds, all of
which offer comparable liquidity and rates.' 38 Active trading markets and low in-
vestment costs ensure that these alternatives are always readily available. Moreover,
these deposit substitutes also are issued without restrictive covenants. An investor can
react to increased risk in any one investment by simply shifting her funds to another
short-term instrument.
2. Why Risk Premiums Do Not Constrain Bank Risk-Taking
Even if depositors do not demand restrictive covenants from their banks, risk
premiums also can serve as a check on managerial discretion. Depositors should
demand sufficient premiums to compensate them for the possibility of future changes
in bank risk. 139 Riskier banks will have to pay higher rates in order to attract funds.
Managers seeking to reduce funding costs will find ways to reassure depositors, such
as by operating their banks in a risk-averse manner.
So why is the market discipline provided by risk premiums not already effective
in reducing bank risk? One problem is that, in the deposit market, partial market
136. Valuing a bank's assets by looking at the dollar amount of outstanding loans does not give a true picture of
default risk or of the risk associated with contingent liabilities, such as standby commitments, that do not appear as assets
on the bank's balance sheet. These problems in arriving at an accurate measure of true asset value have led the bank
regulators to develop complex risk weights for different bank assets as part of their minimum capital-to-asset requirements.
See 12 C.F.R. pt. 203; 225 (1989). In addition, since no active trading markets exist for many loans, asset value may not
represent the actual price at which such loans could be sold to raise cash to pay off depositors.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
138. See supra text accompanying note 71.
139. This discussion relates primarily to uninsured depositors. Insured depositors have less reason to worry about
future risk levels at their banks or to demand high risk premiums. But the presence of insured depositors complicates the
tactical decisions of uninsured depositors and bank management as to risk-taking. See infra text accompanying notes
149-53.
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discipline-risk premiums but no covenants-may be worse than no market disci-
pline at all. For example, assume that Bank A's loan losses are so large that it must
pay a premium over other bank rates to attract investors for its six-month certificates
of deposit. This premium may enable Bank A to find sufficient investors who are
willing to tolerate greater than average risk in exchange for high returns. Yet in order
to pay these high rates for six months, Bank A will be forced to invest depositors'
funds in increasingly high yielding and risky assets. Nothing in the terms of the
deposit contract will restrict this or other increases in risk. Thus, rather than con-
straining bank management, the risk premium demanded by depositors may force
even more risk-taking.
Of course, cautious management may prefer to avoid escalating risk and simply
withdraw from the deposit market until the bank's financial condition improves. Yet
the nature of the banking business may not permit this strategy. The bank may need
new deposits to pay off its maturing liabilities, or it will be forced to liquidate assets.
Since the bank's assets consist primarily of relatively illiquid loans, forced liquidation
of assets may lead to substantial losses on the bank's loan portfolio. Although the
bank could ask the bank regulators for financial assistance, the regulators may impose
onerous terms on management140 or, if the liquidity crisis is severe enough, even
close the bank. Thus, management will prefer to continue to borrow at high rates
rather than to ask the regulators for help. 14t
Moreover, the fact that a bank is willing to pay higher risk premiums on new
deposits may itself provide a negative signal to the deposit market. Depositors will
view any increase in risk premiums as a sign that management has shifted or is
intending to shift into higher risk investments. 142 This signal may affect holders of
maturing deposits. These depositors may be averse to any increased risk and may
refuse to reinvest their funds. If the bank is unable to find new investors at higher
rates to replace these depositors, it may experience a liquidity crisis. The bank may
then be forced to offer still higher premiums to compensate new depositors for the
increased risk.
3. Why Risky Banks Still Attract Depositors
If risk-taking increases too much, eventually most depositors may decide that no
premium can adequately compensate them. Once depositors refuse to fund the bank,
the bank will fail. The ability of depositors to react to unacceptable risk by removing
capital from management's control should be a potent source of discipline.1 43 In
140. See supra text acconipanying note 38 (removal of management as condition to receiving open-bank assistance).
141. This problem has led Congress to try to stop distressed banks from obtaining funds by offering high risk
premiums. Recently enacted thrift restructuring legislation prohibits depository institutions that do not meet minimum
regulatory capital requirements from soliciting deposits by offering rates of interest "significantly higher than the
prevailing rates of interest on deposits" offered by competing institutions. See FIRREA, supra note 8, § 224. How this
prohibition will work in practice is as yet untested. But the prohibition highlights the willingness and ability of troubled
banks to fund increasingly risky projects almost indefinitely by promising increasingly high returns to depositors.
142. See Guttentag & Herring, supra note 121, at 1376 n.20.
143. See Fama & Jensen, supra note 72, at 338.
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effect, depositors' decisions to withdraw funds affect a partial takeover or liquidation
of the bank.144
Yet once such withdrawals begin, bank management has little opportunity to
alter its investment strategy to respond to the market's preferences. The bank already
has made the risky investments to which the market is now objecting. Since loans are
relatively illiquid and have longer terms than the average deposit, it will take time for
management to shift the composition of the bank's loan portfolio. In the meantime,
the bank may have difficulty liquidating sufficient loans to pay off departing depos-
itors. The bank will fail before its management can react positively to the market's
discipline. 145
Of course, bank managers can avoid this unpredictable funding risk by operating
banks in a more risk averse manner. But managers may have difficulty discerning just
how much risk is too much for the deposit market. Since depositors can liquidate their
investments at little or no cost, they may hold their deposits until it is clear that the
bank is about to be closed. Thus, depositors may continue to fund very risky
banks.146 The signals sent by the market as to how much risk is acceptable may be
hard to read. 147
Moreover, each depositor's assessment of the risk associated with her deposit
depends in large part on other depositors' assessments of their own risk. So long as
most depositors are not rushing to liquidate their investments, even unprofitable
banks may remain solvent. But if large numbers of depositors are withdrawing their
funds, then any remaining depositors have reason to join the deposit run to recover
their investments before the bank becomes insolvent. At this point, it is too late for
depositors to protect themselves by demanding covenants or higher risk premiums
from the bank. The actions of their fellow depositors have created an independent and
immediate risk to the bank's solvency. Thus, the actions of depositors are often a
more significant indicator of bank risk than the actions of management. 14 8
Another reason why even risky banks may be able to attract deposits is the
presence in most banks of large numbers of fully insured depositors. 49 Deposit
insurance removes any reason for insured depositors to invest in ongoing monitoring
144. Id.
145. For firms with illiquid or organization-specific assets, redeemable claims create substantial risks. See id. Such
firms would incur substantial costs in trying to liquidate sufficient assets to pay off claimants. Although some financial
institutions, such as mutual funds, hold marketable securities that can be easily liquidated to satisfy claimants, this is not
true of bank loan portfolios. It has been suggested that banks can satisfy their redeemable claims by holding sufficient
treasury securities and other marketable bonds. Id. at 339. Yet the relatively safe securities that are eligible for bank
investment tend to be low yield. As a bank's cost of funds increases, it is likely to shift more of its portfolio into higher
risk, higher yielding illiquid loans. Even risk averse banks cannot afford to maintain sufficiently liquid portfolios to
guarantee all of their deposits. See note 62.
146. There is evidence that otherwise risk-averse depositors leave their funds in financially distressed banks. See
Dickerson, FDIC Says Consumers Leave Large Sums, Uninsured, at Weak Banks, Am. Banker, June 14, 1989, at 7, col.
I.
147. See supra note 109 (describing limits on ability of managers to interpret market signals correctly).
148. See, e.g., Chad & Jagannathan, supra note 63, at 759 (depositors reasonably infer poor prospects for a bank
from the withdrawal decisions of other depositors); Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 63, at 410 (anything that causes
depositors to anticipate a run will lead to a run).
149. Such depositors may hold accounts of $100,000 or less or may hold insured portions of larger certificates of
deposit that have been broken into insured pieces for sale.
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of bank risk-taking. o50 Nevertheless, although insured depositors are not likely to
check the accuracy of information about their bank, they still may react to this
information, whether true or false. This reaction will affect the bank, its manage-
ment, and its other investors. For example, if a badly managed bank can obtain
sufficient insured deposits to meet its funding needs, management may not need to
worry about the bank's reputation among uninsured depositors. This bank's access to
secure funding sources may sufficiently reassure uninsured depositors that they also
may be willing to invest. Yet if negative publicity about this bank suddenly causes
insured depositors to panic and withdraw their funds, uninsured depositors now have
reason to take note and react accordingly.
Deposit insurance should remove incentives for insured depositors to react to
either accurate or inaccurate information about their bank by withdrawing their funds.
Thus, the principal hazard created by deposit insurance should be the willingness of
insured depositors to continue to fund banks that are excessively risky or misman-
aged. If these banks eventually fail, the deposit insurance fund then must bear the cost
of reimbursing inattentive insured depositors.
Yet despite the guarantee of deposit insurance, there have been occasions when
insured depositors have initiated bank runs, often in response to inaccurate informa-
tion. For example, when a bank holding company called Beverly Hills Bancorpora-
tion missed payments on its commercial paper, depositors confused the holding
company with its bank subsidiary, Beverly Hills National Bank, and began with-
drawing their funds. 15 ' In this situation, uninsured depositors cannot afford to sit back
and rely on their superior knowledge of the difference between the legal obligations
of a bank and its holding company. If the confusion of less informed depositors
causes a deposit run, the bank will experience a liquidity crisis and fail.
Thus, in the market for deposits, inaccurate information may crowd out accurate
information.152 Informed depositors must take into account the reactions of less
informed depositors, since this reaction itself is significant news. This interferes with
the ability of depositors to discipline truly bad banks. This danger that market dis-
cipline will be skewed by the inaccurate reactions of uninformed investors is more
serious in the deposit market than in other debt markets. Although rumors can affect
any capital market, most investors in commercial paper or corporate debt simply do
not have the luxury afforded by deposit insurance to remain unsophisticated or
150. Although a distinction is made here between insured and uninsured depositors, some uninsured depositors also
are unable or unwilling to engage in the kind of risk analysis of their banks that might be expected of a sophisticated
investor. Such depositors may maintain their funds in the bank for reasons having little to do with risk and return, such
as the opportunity to obtain other bank services. This author has distinguished "involuntary depositors," including
insured depositors and some uninsured depositors such as holders of payroll or escrow accounts that are maintained
primarily to obtain other banking services, from "investor-depositors" who view deposits as alternatives to other
short-term investments. See Banking, supra note 11, at 134-39. Only the latter depositors have the expertise and incentive
to behave as careful investors in evaluating bank risk.
151. See Mayne, New Directions in Bank Holding Company Supervision, 95 BAlNuKiN L.J. 729, 731 (1978).
152. See Chari & Jagannathan, supra note 63, at 759 (bank runs can occur even if no one has adverse information
about future returns).
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uninformed. Thus, the chance of bad information leading to unpredictable runs is
more likely in the deposit market than in other markets. 53
IV. BANK FAILURE AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
If market discipline by shareholders or depositors is an inadequate substitute for
bank failure policy, are there any other mechanisms that may be more effective in
controlling bank risk? Critics of bank failure policy occasionally suggest that one
factor that has contributed to the high rate of bank failure is the absence of a
significant market for corporate control of banks. A healthy takeover market would
permit the acquisition of marginal firms that are near failure as well as put pressure
on banks to improve their performance in order to avoid becoming targets. 154 Yet
bank acquisitions, particularly hostile takeovers, are discouraged by regulation that
requires prior regulatory approval of a change in control of a regulated bank.155 This
approval process imposes lengthy delays and additional costs on bidders and provides
management with an opportunity to take defensive measures. 56
Although hostile takeovers have occurred in banking, 157 the approval process for
bank acquisitions, as well as many other applicable statutory and regulatory require-
ments such as federal tender offer regulation 58 and state antitakeover statutes, 159
undoubtedly impose costs on takeovers. Nevertheless, there is no necessary relation
between these costs and the frequency of bank failure. The cost of the regulatory
approval process has not prevented the development of a healthy takeover market in
the banking industry. But in that market, the most attractive candidates for acquisition
have not been, nor are likely to be, banks on the road to failure. Thus, encouraging
more bank takeovers will not be effective in eliminating weak or failing banks.
Finally, to the extent that acquisitions do encourage better management at healthy
banks, the regulatory approval process itself may play a significant role in creating
153. Many observers of bank regulation agree that effective depositor discipline is not possible. See, e.g., Benston,
Financial Disclosure and Bank Failure, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLAA EcoN. REv. 5, 9 (Mar. 1984). Some have
suggested that other creditors, such as holders of subordinated debt, are more likely to exert discipline. Such debt is not
as liquid as deposits and is not protected by deposit insurance. Nevertheless, preliminary studies of the subordinated debt
market cast doubt on the effectiveness of even these debtholders' discipline. One such study found risk premiums on
subordinated debt to be unrelated to traditional accounting measures of bank performance and only weakly related to
private sector bond ratings. See Avery, Belton & Goldberg, Market Discipline in Regulating Bank Risk: New Evidence
from the Capital Markets, 20 J. MoNtEY, CREDrr, AND BANKING 596, 608 (1988).
154. See supra text accompanying note 111; Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1203-05. Macey and Miller rely on
an article by Professor Manne advocating takeovers as a means of facilitating the transfer of assets from inefficient to
efficient uses prior to failure. See Manne, supra note 17, at 112-13.
155. Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1212-23. This regulation includes the Bank Holding Company Act, which
covers bank holding company acquisitions, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1982), the Change in Bank Control Act, which covers
acquisitions of banks by individuals, 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j), and the Bank Merger Act, which covers mergers of banks, 12
U.S.C. § 1828(c).
156. Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1222.
157. See The Bank of New York Company. Inc., 74 Fed. Reserve Bull. 257 (1988) (approving hostile bid for Irving
Bank Corporation).
158. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982).
159. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. L. § 912 (McKinney 1986) (forbidding a shareholder that acquires more than 20%
of the stock of a New York corporation without the approval of the board of directors from effecting a merger for five
years).
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these incentives. In fact, the approval process can be a useful tool of bank failure
policy.
A. The Cost of Bank Acquisitions
Any regulation that requires a bidder to obtain prior regulatory approval of its
acquisition of a bank or bank holding company obviously creates certain risks for
both bidders and targets. The application process requires the bidder to submit de-
tailed information to the reviewing regulatory agency, involving considerable time
and expense.160 The filing of the application reveals the bidder's intentions to the
target's management, which may then take steps to fight the acquisition while the
application is pending. The application eventually may be denied, leaving the bidder
with considerable expenses and often resulting in bad publicity, particularly if the
grounds for denial are the bidder's financial or managerial problems. If the applica-
tion is approved, so much time may have passed since its filing that the bidder's
original offer may have become unrealistic and may have to be revised.
The application process affects targets as well. Target management that wants to
resist a bidder may have difficulty finding a white knight. Since rival bidders may
themselves have to go through the application process, they will be hesitant to become
involved unless the outcome can be assured. 161 The pool of potential white knights
is limited by regulation preventing the acquisition of a bank by most nonbanking
firms.' 62 Even if target management decides to sell to the bidder, it will not welcome
delays that may cause the bidder to renegotiate its offer or withdraw it completely.
In view of these constraints on the takeover market, one might expect few
mergers or other acquisitions of banks to take place. Yet over the last few years,
especially as barriers to interstate banking have been removed, the bank takeover
market actually has been very active. 63 Although most acquisitions have been
friendly, at least one hostile bank takeover has succeeded with the approval of the
bank regulators.164
160. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(6) (1982) (information required to be submitted under Change in Bank Control
Act).
161. See, e.g., Matthews & Fraust, White Knight Drops Its Bid for Irving, Am. Banker, Aug. 30, 1988, at 1, col.
2 (inability of white knight to meet Bank Holding Company Act's requirements). Even an agreement by a white knight
to buy a substantial block of stock to deter an unwelcome raider will require regulatory approval. The Bank Holding
Company Act requires prior regulatory approval of the acquisition of control of a bank, which may exist when a purchaser
buys as little as five percent of the bank's voting stock. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1982). The Change in Bank Control
Act may require prior notice of acquisitions of ten percent of the bank's voting stock. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.41(b)(2)
(1989).
162. See Bank Holding Company Act § 4(c)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (Supp. V 1987), amended by FIRREA,
supra note 8, § 601 (permitting holding company acquisitions of thrifts).
163. The average annual number of bank mergers in the 1980s was triple that of the 1960s and double that of the
1970s. See Hunter & Wall, Bank Merger Motivations: A Review of the Evidence and an Examination of Key Target Bank
Characteristics, FED. REsExvE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REv. 2 (Sept./Oct. 1989). Under the Bank Holding Company Act,
states have the authority to permit or forbid acquisitions of banks operating within the state by out-of-state bank holding
companies. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(d) (1982). Over the past five years, many states have permitted limited or full entry by
out-of-state bank holding companies. See Savage, Interstate Banking Developments, 73 Fed. Reserve Bull. 79 (1987).
Changes in state law generally have been followed by frenzied takeover activity.
164. See supra note 157 (Bank of New York/Irving). Although a subsequent highly publicized hostile bid by NCNB
for Citizens & Southern failed, this defeat was hardly evidence that hostile takeovers are impossible in banking. Rather,
the legal and tactical manoeuvering by both bidder and target suggested that the bank takeover game is becoming just like
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This suggests that the cost of the application process, although not insignificant,
may have less of a deterrent effect on bank acquisitions than has been assumed.
Certainly, the acquisition process is not much more costly than other avenues of bank
expansion. A bank looking to expand its banking operations into a new market has
two options: it can acquire an existing bank or it can enter the market de novo by
forming a new bank or branch. Yet opening a new bank or branch also requires the
bank to obtain prior regulatory approval.t 65 There is no evidence that the cost of the
acquisition process has caused banks to prefer expansion by chartering new banks or
to avoid expansion altogether.
Moreover, the cost of the approval process often is matched, if not exceeded, by
other legal barriers to takeovers. For example, The Bank of New York's hostile bid
for Irving Bank Corporation was approved by the Federal Reserve Board, 166 but was
delayed by a state antitakeover law that prevented completion of a hostile takeover for
five years.' 67 In addition, Bank of New York had to commence lengthy judicial
proceedings to challenge Irving's poison pill. 68 Nevertheless, almost eight months
after regulatory approval was granted, Bank of New York won its battle to acquire
Irving.' 69 Although the additional costs imposed on the bidder by both the banking
and corporate laws may be substantial, they have not prevented the development of
a market for corporate control in banking. 17 0
It is generally assumed that prior regulatory approval requirements especially
deter hostile takeovers of banks by forcing bidders to reveal their intentions and
giving targets time to take defensive measures. 171 Yet most defensive measures, such
as poison pills and other charter changes, can easily be adopted well in advance of an
actual takeover threat.' 72 The ability of target management to take some defensive
measures, such as selling the bank to a white knight, is limited by the same regulatory
approval requirements that delay hostile bids. 173
Moreover, the regulatory approval process does not necessarily favor negotiated
mergers over hostile bids. In approving Bank of New York's application to acquire
Irving, the Federal Reserve Board explicitly refused to distinguish between friendly
other corporate takeover battles. For a discussion of these tactics, see Murphy, A Path Twice Taken: NCNB's Unsuccessful
Pursuit ofC & S, 8 BANK ExPANsioo RPTm. 1 (June 19, 1989).
165. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982) (national bank may establish new branch with approval of the Comptroller
of the Currency).
166. See 74 Fed. Reserve Bull. 257.
167. N.Y. Bus. Cone. L. § 912 (McKinney 1986).
168. Irving had adopted a Shareholders' Purchase Rights Plan that would have permitted Irving shareholders to buy
$400 of an acquiring company's stock for $200. This provision was declared invalid by a New York court. See Matthews,
Irving Loses Appeal On Poison Pill Plan, Am. Banker, Oct. 5, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
169. See Fraust, Irving's Rice Gives In to Hostile Bid, Am. Banker, Oct. 6, 1988, at 1, col. 2. Irving surrended only
after its poison pill was invalidated. See supra note 168.
170. It is noteworthy that bank equity investors believe that an active market exists for corporate control of banks.
During the first half of 1989, the best performers among bank stocks were those that were viewed as likely targets for
acquisition. See Matthews, Bank Stocks Outperform the Market; Takeover CandidatesAre Big Gainers, Am. Banker, July
12, 1989, at 2, col. 2.
171. See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1217-18.
172. For example, C & S had put into place antitakeover devices such as a staggered board long in advance of
NCNB's hostile bid. See Murphy, supra note 164, at 15.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 161-62.
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and hostile acquisitions, rejecting Irving's argument that hostile takeovers are harmful
to the banking industry. 174 The Board's principal concern was that defensive measures
and legal battles unrelated to the regulatory approval process would delay consum-
mation of the acquisition. 175 This suggests that the bank regulators are not permitting
targets to use the regulatory approval process as a defense to hostile takeovers.
Finally, the steps leading to a hostile bid are not so different from those leading
to a friendly merger. The bidder first will approach target management (and the
appropriate bank regulator) with its offer. If the price is attractive, target management
may decide to sell even if the bank was not previously in the market for a buyer. The
bid will become hostile only if management rejects the offer. Even if the regulatory
approval process deters some bidders from going forward with hostile offers, hostile
acquisitions are not necessarily more efficient than friendly acquisitions. Inefficient
managers of unprofitable banks may be attracted by an opportunity to sell out at a
premium, particularly if they are also shareholders. Efficient managers may have good
reasons to resist an inadequate offer. Thus, there is no reason to assume that hostile
takeovers of banks result in better allocations of resources than friendly takeovers.
B. Acquisitions and Target Banks
Even if the cost of the regulatory approval process does in fact deter some
takeovers, dismantling this regulation and facilitating bank acquisitions is unlikely to
reduce bank failure rates. Many bank failures are caused at least in part by insider
abuse, fraud, or serious mismanagement. 176 Although not all such bad banks fail and
there are other causes of bank failure, badly managed banks pose a sufficient risk to
the regulatory system that their elimination through acquisition would be desirable.
Yet this sort of bank is hardly likely to be an attractive candidate for acquisition,
particularly by a hostile takeover. Fraud in a bank has proven very difficult for
outsiders to detect until its effect on the bank has become serious. Even the bank
regulators have been frustrated in attempts to identify and correct insider abuse before
it leads to failure. 177 A rival bank looking for an acquisition target will be unlikely to
discover fraud. In a hostile takeover, the bidder will not be given an opportunity to
conduct any due diligence investigation of its target. Even in a friendly acquisition,
the target has a reason to hide serious management problems that could cause the
bidder to lower its offering price.
Moreover, if a bank's management problems are serious enough to become
apparent to the regulators or the market, then many potential bidders will be deterred.
Few bidders want to take the risk that the bank's former management has incurred
huge contingent liabilities that are discovered only after the acquisition is completed.
This problem already faces the FDIC in attempting to arrange mergers of banks that
have failed because of serious insider abuse. Even if the FDIC finds a willing buyer,
174. See 74 Fed. Reserve Bull. 257, 259.
175. The Board denied Irving's request for a formal hearing on the application and was reluctant to extend the 90-
day period for consummation of the acquisition following regulatory approval. Id. at 271-72.
176. See supra note 59.
177. See supra note 66.
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that buyer may require such a large indemnity against future liabilities that the cost
of arranging the merger exceeds that of liquidation.t 78 Bidders for failed banks at
least have the opportunity to do a preliminary evaluation of the bank's condition. 179
In a hostile takeover, the bidder has no opportunity to evaluate how deeply the effects
of mismanagement have been felt by the bank.
Thus, bad banks do not make good targets for acquisition.8 0 Bidders are likely
to be more attracted to banks that possess a valuable asset that the acquiring bank needs.
For example, a bidder which itself is heavily dependent on purchased funds may be
attracted by a target bank's stable base of core deposits, which provide a reliable source
of inexpensive funds. An established branch network may be a value to a bidder
seeking to expand into new retail banking markets.'Is The target bank's unique market
position, which may result from expertise in particular operations such as trust or
securities services or simply lack of competition, may attract a bidder with comple-
mentary strengths.182
These banks will be takeover candidates only if they are reasonably priced. A
bidder will not buy a bank to get its branch network unless the cost of acquisition is
less than the cost of building a branch network in some other way. Thus, banks will
be attractive targets if their assets are undervalued by the market. But banks with
depressed share prices are not necessarily problem banks on the road to failure. A
bank's share price may be low because its management is overly cautious and has not
exploited its assets to the fullest extent. 183 The bank may be underleveraged, 184 or
may invest in safe but low yielding assets. 185
178. See J. SINKEY, PROBLEM AND FAttED INSTrTUTIONS I  THE COMMERcIAL BANKo INDUSTRY 37-38 (1979).
179. In addition to providing information, the FDIC occasionally has allowed bidders access to the failed bank to
permit a review of its condition. See Bovenzi & Murton, supra note 2, at 12.
180. Cf. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in
Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1203-04 (1984) (noting that the level of risk associated with nearly
insolvent firms makes them unlikely candidates for acquisition). Studies of past bank mergers have failed to find empirical
support for the proposition that bank acquisitions are undertaken to improve the efficiency of mismanaged institutions. See
Hunter & wall, supra note 163, at 11. Instead, most mergers appeared to be motivated by opportunities for improving
economies of scale or increasing market concentration. See id. at 5-10 (summarizing prior empirical research on bank
acquisitions).
181. When state restrictions on interstate banking limited opportunities to acquire healthy out-of-state banks, many
banks weie willing to pay premiums to buy failed out-of-state banks or thrifts in order to build an interstate network. See
Citicorp, New York, NY, 68 Fed. Reserve Bull. 656 (1982) (acquisition of failed out-of-state thrift). Now that interstate
banking barriers are disappearing, the attractiveness of failed institutions as targets also has diminished. See supra note
163 (changes in state laws prohibiting interstate banking); FIRREA, supra note 8, § 601 (amending 12 U.S.C. §
1843(c)(8) to permit bank holding companies to acquire healthy thrifts).
182. For example, Irving's leadership in computerization and data processing was one of its major attractions to
Bank of New York. Moreover, since Irving's capital investment in computer equipment had depressed its earnings and
stock price, this expertise could be acquired relatively cheaply. See Neustadt, Rice's Expertise in Technology May Have
Led Irving into Trouble, Am. Banker, Oct. 6, 1988, at 15, col. 1.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 114-17 (tendency of management to be risk averse).
184. Although banks in general are highly leveraged, some banks actually have higher equity to asset ratios than are
required by banking law or preferred by shareholders.
185. That there may be a difference between a "bad" bank-a problem bank on the road to failure-and an
undervalued bank can be illustrated by a simple example. Bank A invests in low risk loans and liquid treasury securities.
These investments are adequate to cover Bank A's debt charges and produce a small return for shareholders. Bank B
invests in high risk loans, a quantity of which are nonperforming. Although its interest income from its risky portfolio
remains high, it must pay substantial risk premiums to attract deposits, reducing its net profits. As potential equity
investments, both banks under current management present a risk of low earnings, and share prices will be depressed
accordingly. But as potential takeover targets, Bank A presents less risk than Bank B. An acquiring firm can pay a low
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Threat of a hostile takeover may cause this management to become more ag-
gressive in order to improve the bank's performance and increase its share price. If
management thereby operates the bank more efficiently, then the pressure exerted by
the threat of a takeover is beneficial. Yet there is also a danger that, in order to keep
share prices high, management will engage in increasingly risky behavior to improve
performance. This pressure will be especially strong when the banking industry in
general is suffering an economic downturn.18 6 If loan spreads are low, management
may make increasingly risky loans in order to prevent a decline in earnings. These
actions may satisfy bank shareholders. Yet management also may be increasing the
risk of bank failure.
Alternatively, bank managers who fear takeovers may react like managers of
nonbank corporations and put into place shark repellents and other antitakeover
devices. These actions may have unintended consequences for bank failure policy.
Some of the measures that bank managers may adopt to discourage takeovers may
simply be bad banking policy. For example, a bank holding company may commence
an acquisition program with the intention of becoming too large for most raiders to
swallow.' 87 Yet these acquisitions may prove difficult to integrate with existing
operations or to manage effectively, ultimately weakening the banking organization.
And if the bank fails, it now may be too large to permit an easy regulatory
disposition. 188
C. Takeovers and Regulatory Discipline
Encouraging a more active bank takeover market is unlikely to have much of an
effect on bank failure. Nevertheless, the regulatory approval process itself may play
a role in encouraging better management of banks before they fail. As part of the
regulatory approval process, the bank regulators evaluate the financial and manage-
rial resources and future prospects of the bank holding companies and banks involved
in an acquisition. 89 The regulators can use this authority to condition their approval
price for Bank A, sell its securities portfolio and reinvest the funds in higher yielding loans, thereby improving earnings.
Improving Bank B's earnings will require new managers to work through Bank B's loan problems and gradually shift the
composition of Bank B's loan portfolio into less risky assets in order to persuade depositors to accept lower risk premiums.
Before this can be accomplished, Bank B may fail as a result of deteriorating assets, inability to attract sufficient funding,
or both.
186. The tendency of the takeover market to concentrate on particular depressed industries has been noted. See
Coffee, supra note 180, at 1210-1I. In recent years, the stock market has tended to penalize entire classes of banks, such
as money center or regional banks, making them inexpensive targets for other banks.
187. If such acquisitions require prior regulatory approval, the approval process may prevent this defensive tactic.
See supra text accompanying note 173.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100 (describing constraints on regulators' choice of disposition of failed
banks). Ironically, a possible motivation for some bank acquisitions is the desire to become "too big to fail"--to hold
so many insured deposits that in the event of financial distress the regulators will be forced to arrange a merger or provide
open-bank assistance. If uninsured depositors view large banks as liquidation-proof, banks have an incentive to grow in
order to attract these depositors. An unregulated bank takeover market that facilitates growth-motivated mergers would only
increase the regulators' existing problems in disposing of failed banks.
189. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1982) (Bank Holding Company Act); 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(7)(C) & (D) (Change in
Bank Control Act); 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (Bank Merger Act).
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of an acquisition on the acquiring bank's taking certain steps, such as improving its
capital or its target's capital, that will strengthen the combined enterprise. 90 The
regulators can deny an application if they determine that the acquisition is likely to
weaken the acquiring bank. 19'
Thus, the approval process is one of the few remaining sources of regulatory
pressure on bank management to reduce its risk-taking prior to actual failure. Once
a bank has failed, it is too late for the FDIC to bring regulatory pressure to bear. The
agency's main concern is to arrange the rapid disposition of the failed bank's business
at the lowest possible cost. ' 92
In contrast, in a healthy bank acquisition, the regulators can look closely at the
condition and prospects of both the bidder and the target. Although this regulatory
discipline primarily affects the bidder, the outcome of the regulatory approval process
affects targets as well. Although the regulators cannot ensure that all bad banks
become targets, they are likely to approve a change in control of a weak bank.
Moreover, they can insist that the bidder takes steps to strengthen the target, includ-
ing redeploying assets and increasing capital. Finally, they can prevent weak banks
from trying to solve their problems by acquiring still weaker banks. 193
Of course, the regulators' exercise of this discretionary conditioning power may
increase uncertainty as to the outcome of a bid, discouraging some takeovers. Yet
fear of negative publicity following an actual denial of an application 94 causes most
bidders to approach the regulators privately before formally filing an application. The
regulators provide some indication of what, if any, conditions they may impose on
the applicant, enabling the bidder to assess the cost of the acquisition. As these
conditions generally involve raising new capital, the bidder must take into account the
equity market's probable reaction to its acquisition. 195
Critics of regulation are uneasy about entrusting bank regulators with this dis-
cretion over the takeover market. Regulators may be biased for or against acquisitions
or may make the wrong judgment in individual cases. Some potentially efficient
mergers may never take place. Many candidates for bank failure will never go
through the application process and will avoid this discipline.
In part, these objections raise the question of why the regulators are any better
190. See The Bank of New York Company, Inc., 74 Fed. Reserve Bull. at 264-65 (requiring Bank of New York to
raise additional equity capital to support cash portion of its offer for Irving). In some cases, the regulators require the
applicant to raise capital above the minimum regulatory capital requirements in order to offset any unanticipated losses
resulting from the acquisition, such as difficulties in integrating operations. See id. at 265.
191. For example, the Federal Reserve Board denied an application by Franklin National Corporation, parent
company of the troubled Franklin National Bank, to acquire a nonbank financial company on the ground that the
acquisition would interfere with the holding company's efforts to strengthen the bank. Several months later, the bank
failed. See J. SINKEY, supra note 178, at 148.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 92-100.
193. For example, the Federal Reserve Board's insistence that the pro forma capitalization of the resulting company
following acquisition at least equal the target's capitalization prior to acquisition discourages acquisition of strongly
capitalized banks by weaker bidders. See Murphy, supra note 164, at 15.
194. For example, the denial on financial grounds of Franklin National's application to acquire a nonbank subsidiary
raised d L't about the solvency of Franklin's subsidiary bank, leading to deposit runs. See J. SiNKmY, supra note 178,
at 148.
195. See Murphy, supra note 164, at 15.
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than shareholders, depositors, or bidders at identifying' and disciplining problem
banks. The relative superiority of the unregulated market or of the government in
achieving this or any other policy goal is likely to be subject to ongoing debate among
banking law scholars and economists generally. 196 There is a tendency to cite prob-
lems with one approach as a complete justification of the other approach. For ex-
ample, the high incidence of bank failure prior to the development of modern banking
regulation is support for continuing regulatory intervention. Conversely, regulatory
errors in handling individual bank failures are treated as sufficient reason for dereg-
ulation and reliance on market forces. In fact, either argument proves only that
neither market nor regulatory solutions to the bank failure problem are likely to be
perfect.
A better approach may be to compare, to the extent possible, the efficacy of
market and regulatory forces in achieving desired outcomes. Bank failure is suffi-
ciently costly that reducing the incidence of failure is desirable. 197 Experience has
shown that regulation cannot prevent bank failure, but, as this Article has suggested,
there are also serious impediments to effective discipline by other bank stake-
holders.1 98 Because of the deposit insurance system, however, the regulators have a
more direct stake in preventing bank failure than shareholders, depositors, or
bidders. 199 Moreover, although imperfect, the regulatory discipline exercised through
the application process is likely to have a more direct impact on bank management
than other disciplinary efforts.200
V. THE FUTURE OF BANK FAILURE POLICY
Ultimately, the principal objection to current bank failure policy is that it does
not prevent bank failure. Yet, as this Article has pointed out, this goal may be
unrealistic. So long as bank failure policy must take into account the cost of failure
196. See, e.g., wolf, A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework For Implementation and Analysis, 22 J.L. &
ECON. 107 (1979).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79 (costs of bank failure).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 103-53.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 92-100.
200. Proponents of a more active takeover market may argue that regulatory review of acquisitions is unnecessary,
since the equity market will discourage inefficient takeovers by penalizing the acquiring firm. As previously argued,
however, shareholders may have difficulty making their discipline felt through market signals. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 105-09. Moreover, this faith in the securities markets to prevent inefficient takeovers is somewhat puzzling.
If bank shareholders are capable of identifying and penalizing poor management decisions, then reliance on acquiring
firms to remove bad management is unnecessary. Target company shareholders should replace inefficient managers
themselves, removing the need for a takeover. If individual shareholders are too dispersed and powerless to discipline
management through ordinary market mechanisms, then the only way to discipline inefficient takeovers is for another
raider to take over and bust up a firm that has made a bad acquisition. Maybe this does occur. See Coffee, supra note 114,
at 2-3 (describing "bust-up" takeovers). But it is doubtful that this really is a more efficient way to police inefficient bank
takeovers than the regulatory approval process.
Regulatory conditioning power may also be criticized when the agency uses its power to impose new, controversial
policy without the opportunity for public comment orjudicial review. See Aman, Bargaining For Justice:An Examination
of the Use and Limits of Conditions by the Federal Reserve Board, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 837, 886-98 (1989). In reviewing
the financial condition and management of merging banks, however, the regulators' use of conditioning power is fully
consistent with the individual scrutiny contemplated by the bank acquisition statutes. See id. at 888.
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to the deposit insurance fund, it cannot be concerned solely with creating incentives
for better management of healthy banks. Moreover, the ability of any bank failure
policy to create these incentives seems doubtful.
Thus, critics of bank failure policy should be looking at how successful that
policy has been in achieving realistic goals. If the cost of failure resolution must be
the primary consideration, does current bank failure policy in fact result in the least
costly solution? Failure costs might be reduced further if problem banks were closed
more promptly.20t New, potentially less costly methods of handling failed banks
might be tried.202
More generally, evaluation of bank failure policy requires some rethinking of the
goals of bank regulation. Critics who fault bank failure policy for the current rate of
bank failure may be misassigning the blame. Problems with bank failure policy
reflect the failings of the deposit insurance system and of regulation of healthy banks.
Reforming bank failure policy first requires some action to relieve pressure on the
deposit insurance system, either by curtailing insurance protection 2 3 or by ensuring
the system's adequacy to deal with more frequent and costly bank failure. Despite the
recent recapitalization, 2°4 the insurance fund still may not be adequate to handle
future bank failures if they continue at present rates. The regulators still must be
primarily concerned with minimizing the cost of failure to the insurance fund, despite
the consequences of that policy for bank investors, managers, and the banking sys-
tem. Any change in this bank failure policy will require the commitment of substan-
tial additional resources to the insurance system.
More fundamentally, a decision must be made about the level of government
regulation of healthy banks that is desirable to achieve an appropriate rate of bank
failure that can be handled by the insurance system. The crisis recently experienced
by the thrift insurance fund, and related concern over the bank insurance fund, have
temporarily halted debate over deregulation or reregulation of healthy banks. Yet the
question of healthy bank regulation affects bank failure policy. Regulatory resources
can be devoted either to finding ways to control bank risk prior to failure or to dealing
with the consequences of more bank failure.
These issues are not likely to be resolved rapidly. In the meantime, banks are
failing and the bank regulators are left to manage the consequences. Operating under
these conditions of uncertainty, current bank failure policy has proved remarkably
successful.
201. For example, appointment ofa receiver for a bank as soon as losses have exhausted its equity capital may limit
opportunities for the bank's shareholders and managers to continue to gamble with depositors' funds, increasing the
ultimate cost of a regulatory disposition. See supra note 121 (describing shareholders' and managers' incentives to gamble
as bank condition deteriorates); see also Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Rules, Policies and Procedures for
Corporate Activities; Receivership and Conservatorship, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,072 (July 5, 1989) (proposal to declare national
banks insolvent when losses eliminate equity capital).
202. Since the cost of failure resolution is of direct concern to the FDIC, the agency itself continuously experiments
with new approaches. For example, recently the agency has been developing procedures that would allow more bidders
to compete for failed banks. See Bovenzi & Mutton, supra note 2, at 13.
203. See supra note 13 (describing proposals to limit insurance coverage).
204. See supra note 8.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Bank failure policy is not designed to produce more perfect banks or to assign
responsibility for bank failure to shareholders or depositors. It is designed to facilitate
the rapid reallocation of banking resources following bank failure. In achieving this
goal, current bank failure policy is more efficient, and far less disruptive, than
alternative bankruptcy or reorganization procedures.
